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ABSTRACT
As COVID-19 has spread around the world, many states have
suspended their compliance with a core requirement of international
refugee law: the duty to refrain from returning refugees to territories
where they face a serious risk of persecution (the duty of nonrefoulement). These measures have prompted some observers to
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question whether non-refoulement will survive the pandemic as a
nonderogable legal duty. This Article explains why the international
community should embrace non-refoulement as a peremptory norm
of general international law (jus cogens) that applies even during
public emergencies, such as the coronavirus pandemic. Viewed from
a global justice perspective, the authority that international law
entrusts to states—including the sovereign power to regulate
migration across national borders—can be legitimate only if states
refrain from refoulement. For the international legal order to claim
to possess legitimate authority over exiled outsiders, it must treat
non-refoulement as a jus cogens norm. A failure to regard nonrefoulement as a peremptory norm would thus strip the international
legal system of its claim to legality vis-à-vis asylum seekers, supplanting the rule of international law in this context with mere
coercive force. To test this account of the authority of international
refugee law, the Article surveys closed-border policies that states have
adopted in response to COVID-19 and explains why the associated
restrictions on non-refoulement are unjustifiable and incompatible
with the rule of law. Even during a genuine national emergency,
such as the COVID-19 pandemic, receiving states cannot return
refugees to persecution without subverting their own claims to legal
authority.
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INTRODUCTION
As COVID-19 has spread around the world, many states have
wavered in their commitment to respect a core requirement of
international refugee law (IRL): the duty of non-refoulement. The
duty’s classic formulation appears in the 1951 Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention), which provides that
a state may not “expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom
would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”1 Even
before the pandemic arrived in early 2020, mass migrations from
Central America, Myanmar, northern Africa, and Syria were
already testing states’ political will to abide by the duty of nonrefoulement.2 Fears of COVID-19 have prompted nearly all countries
to restrict international transit, drawing refugee migration to a
near-dead halt worldwide.3 As states have closed their borders,
refugees have lost access to this protection guaranteed under international law.4 These developments have exposed the fragility of
IRL5 and have prompted some observers to question whether nonrefoulement will survive the pandemic as a nonderogable legal duty.6
1. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 33(1), July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T.
6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954) [hereinafter Refugee Convention].
The duty is commonly understood to apply to states that confront asylum seekers at their
borders. Arguably it also applies to states that send out interdiction forces beyond their
borders to intercept refugees offshore, which we discuss briefly in Part III.
2. See generally REDRESS, MASS REFUGEE INFLUXES, REFOULMENT AND THE PROHIBITION
AGAINST TORTURE (2016), https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5800ecd14.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2LH8-XRXB].
3. See NASAR MEER & LESLIE VILLEGAS, THE IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON GLOBAL MIGRATION
4 (2020), http://www.glimer.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Global-Migration-Policies-andCOVID-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4FC-BS2A] (finding that by April 2020, states had
introduced “roughly 46,000 mobility restrictions,” resulting in the closure of most
international borders for most nonessential travel).
4. See infra Part III.D.
5. See Alex Aleinikoff, The Fragility of the Global Mobility Regime, PUB. SEMINAR
(May 19, 2020), https://publicseminar.org/2020/05/the-fragility-of-the-global-mobility-regime/
[https://perma.cc/5QZC-WFB3] (“There is only one thing we can say for sure now: We have
learned just how fragile the global mobility regime is.”).
6. See Lama Mourad & Stephanie Schwartz, Could COVID-19 Upend International
Asylum Norms?, LAWFARE (Apr. 9, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/could-covid-
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In this Article, we push back against these trends by explaining
why the international community should embrace the duty of nonrefoulement as a peremptory norm of general international law (jus
cogens) that applies even during public emergencies, such as the
coronavirus pandemic.7 When viewed from a global justice perspective, the authority that international law entrusts to states—including the sovereign power to regulate migration across their
borders—can be understood as legitimate only if states refrain from
refoulement.8 This has become only more evident as states have
erected new barriers to refugee migration in response to COVID-19.
Far from demonstrating the need for IRL to give states greater
flexibility in responding to refugee migration, we argue that the
COVID-19 crisis illustrates why the legitimacy of the international
legal system as a whole depends on refugees enjoying uninterrupted
access to protection from persecution. In a just international legal
order, the international community would embrace the duty of nonrefoulement as jus cogens. Indeed, we go a step further and make a
conceptual claim about the legal character of the international legal
system. For the international legal order of multiple territorial
states to be a legal order for exiled outsiders, it must treat the duty
19-upend-international-asylum-norms [https://perma.cc/XZG6-CPNJ] (lamenting the “ominous
threat ... that states and international organizations will allow COVID-19-inspired emergency
policies to endure post-crisis”).
7. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, opened for signature May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter VCLT] (defining a “peremptory norm of
general international law” as one “accepted and recognized by the international community
of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character”
(emphasis added)). We adopt a conventional view of jus cogens under which the norms that
belong to this set, such as the prohibitions on genocide, slavery, and military aggression, are
not subject to derogation or justifiable infringement or limitation. We defend this account
elsewhere. See Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens, 34
YALE J. INT’L L. 331 (2009). But for skeptics who doubt our account or its application to the
duty of non-refoulement, they can put to one side our claim that the duty of non-refoulement
is a jus cogens norm of international law. We invite the jus cogens skeptic to read
“peremptory” and “jus cogens” in this Article as proxy expressions of a substantive claim that
all states have a nonderogable duty not to return to persecution asylum seekers at or en route
to their borders. States cannot use national security, health, public order, or any other state
interest to avoid this duty. The duty is absolute and so not subject to restriction, limitation,
or derogation. It is absolute in this sense whether or not it ultimately falls to be classified as
jus cogens (though we will argue that it should be so classified). We thank Joseph Weiler for
suggesting this clarification.
8. See infra Part II.B.
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of non-refoulement as jus cogens. A failure to do so would render the
international legal system incapable of claiming to possess legitimate authority vis-à-vis asylum seekers, supplanting the rule of
international law in this context with an extralegal use of mere
coercive force. The COVID-19 crisis has thus exposed the conditional
nature of the international legal order’s claim to legality and
normative legitimacy vis-à-vis refugees.
Legal scholars have debated whether international law already
characterizes the duty of non-refoulement as a peremptory norm of
general international law. The Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(Torture Convention) prohibits states from returning people to
territories where they would face a substantial risk of torture.9
When a refugee does not face torture, however, the prevailing view
is that states may sometimes withhold protection. For example,
although the Refugee Convention does not allow states to make
blanket derogations from the prohibition of refoulement during
emergencies, it does permit states to deny protection on a case-bycase basis when “there are reasonable grounds for regarding [a
particular refugee] as a danger to the security of the country.”10
Some regional treaties and declarations from Africa, Latin America,
and the Caribbean take a different approach, proclaiming that the
duty of non-refoulement is not subject to derogation or limitation
under any circumstances.11 In effect, these regional instruments
9. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment art. 3(1), Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 113 [hereinafter Torture Convention]; see
infra Part I.B.
10. Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 33(2); see also id. art. 1(F).
11. See Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art.
22(8), Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American Convention]
(“In no case may an alien be deported or returned to a country, regardless of whether or not
it is his country of origin, if in that country his right to life or personal freedom is in danger
of being violated because of his race, nationality, religion, social status, or political opinions.”);
Organization of African Unity, Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee
Problems in Africa art. I(4)-(5), Sept. 10, 1969, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45 [hereinafter African Refugee
Convention]; Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Colloquium on the International Protection
of Refugees in Central America, Mexico and Panama § III, ¶ 5, Nov. 22, 1984 [hereinafter
Cartagena Declaration], https://www.oas.org/dil/1984_cartagena_declaration_on_refugees.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VP2Y-AUDB]; Brazil Declaration: “A Framework for Cooperation and
Regional Solidarity to Strengthen the International Protection of Refugees, Displaced and
Stateless Persons in Latin America and the Caribbean,” Dec. 3, 2014 [hereinafter Brazil
Declaration], https://www.refworld.org/docid/5487065b4.html [https://perma.cc/NK8Q-ZD3P].
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endorse the duty of non-refoulement as a peremptory norm. Yet,
given that states outside these regions continue to rely on the
Refugee Convention’s limitation clauses, it is debatable whether this
characterization of the duty as a peremptory norm is now part of
general customary international law.12
By accepting the possibility that national security and other
important state interests might justify refoulement, the Refugee
Convention endorses a distinctive account of the state’s role in
international legal order. According to this account, states owe a
special loyalty to their own people. When granting protection to a
particular refugee could undermine national security, the state’s
responsibility to its people dictates that it may privilege domestic
security interests over a refugee’s interest in freedom from persecution.13 Although the Refugee Convention does not contain a general
derogation clause, it is not hard to see how the Convention’s implicit
framing of a state’s duty to its people could be extended to justify
broader derogations from the duty of non-refoulement.14 If a state
may legitimately favor the interests of its own people over those of
“alien” refugees, this opens the door to the possibility that some
general derogations, such as border closures during a deadly
pandemic, might also represent legitimate expressions of the state’s
special loyalty to its people.15
We argue that this account of the state’s role is misguided and
that a proper apprehension of the state’s role within international
legal order supports accepting the duty of non-refoulement as a
peremptory norm. To arrive at this conclusion, we develop a
fiduciary and dual commissions theory of IRL. Under this theory,
international law entrusts states with local fiduciary powers to
govern and represent their people and with supranational fiduciary
12. See infra Part I.C.
13. See, e.g., Refugee Convention, supra note 1, arts. 9, 32, 33(2) (permitting states to
privilege national security concerns over the interests of refugees in some contexts).
14. See, e.g., id.
15. Indeed, for years after the Refugee Convention entered into force, the international
community toyed with the idea that states might legitimately derogate from the duty of nonrefoulement during a mass influx. See G.A. Res. 2312 (XXII), Declaration on Territorial
Asylum art. 3(2) (Dec. 14, 1967) [hereinafter Declaration on Territorial Asylum] (asserting
that states might make an “[e]xception” to the duty of non-refoulement “only for overriding
reasons of national security or in order to safeguard the population, as in the case of a mass
influx of persons”).
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powers to act on behalf of humanity, usually jointly with other
states and sometimes globally. Fiduciary states thus have local and
transnational or global commissions. Their global commission
includes a duty to enact multilaterally a system of surrogate
protection for asylum seekers, a cornerstone of which is the duty of
non-refoulement. This duty is immanent to, and partially constitutive of, the international legal order vis-à-vis refugees. As we shall
see, but for this duty, asylum seekers would suffer incurable
domination when confronting receiving states, with the looming
possibility that their mere physical presence anywhere in the world
might be treated as a trespass. They would do wrong just by
existing. In our view, no legal system can treat a subject’s mere
existence as a wrong and claim to possess legitimate authority over
them.16
In Part I, we take stock of international law’s present understanding of non-refoulement. We suggest that evidence of its
peremptory status is mixed, but that there are some encouraging
grounds for thinking that non-refoulement is progressively acquiring
the status of jus cogens. In Part II, we consider a series of objections
to the idea of non-refoulement as a peremptory norm. These include
objections based on the special loyalty states owe their people; the
right to exclude, said to follow from a political community’s freedom
of association and right to self-determination; doctrine from
international law that accords robust autonomy to states; and Carl
Schmitt’s theory of sovereignty in which the executive enjoys legally
unlimited discretionary power. We then develop the dual commissions theory and answer the objections, explaining why the case for
a peremptory duty of non-refoulement remains persuasive. In Part
III, we look at closed-border policies that have arisen in response to
the COVID-19 pandemic and use these as a test case for our theory.
We conclude that pandemic-induced restrictions on non-refoulement

16. In previous work, we have argued that this account supports broadening the Refugee
Convention’s definition of “refugee” to include other forced migrants whose lives or freedom
are threatened by “catastrophic natural disaster, economic meltdown, or civil strife.” EVAN J.
CRIDDLE & EVAN FOX-DECENT, FIDUCIARIES OF HUMANITY: HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW
CONSTITUTES AUTHORITY 272-73 (2016). We bracket that issue here, however, in order to focus
on whether international law should be understood to permit states to limit or derogate from
the duty of non-refoulement.
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are unjustifiable. Receiving states cannot return refugees to
persecution without subverting their own legal authority.
I. DOES INTERNATIONAL LAW RECOGNIZE NON-REFOULEMENT AS A
PEREMPTORY NORM?
If the prohibition of refoulement is indeed a peremptory norm of
general international law (jus cogens), this would have significant
consequences for how states may lawfully respond to perceived
national security and other threats, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. Jus cogens norms occupy a distinctive position within the
international legal order because they are mandatory, universal, do
not admit limitation or derogation, and can be modified or abridged
only by international norms of equivalent authority.17 Treaties that
are inconsistent with peremptory norms are void, and national laws
and practices that violate peremptory norms are invalid under
international law.18 Recognizing the non-refoulement principle as a
peremptory norm would therefore preclude states from returning
refugees to persecution under any circumstances, including in
response to extradition requests, mass influxes of migrants, or
possible health threats associated with a global pandemic.
In this Part, we review international law and scholarship to
assess whether the non-refoulement principle has achieved global
recognition as jus cogens. Our conclusions are mixed. International
law clearly prohibits states from returning a person to a territory
where she would be threatened with torture.19 This prohibition finds
expression in multilateral treaties, is enshrined in customary
international law, and enjoys widespread acceptance as a peremptory norm.20 When torture is not a real risk, however, it is less
certain whether general international law absolutely prohibits
states from returning refugees to persecution. Some regional
treaties and soft law instruments characterize this broader
17. See VCLT, supra note 7, art. 53 (defining a peremptory norm as one “accepted and
recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general
international law having the same character”).
18. See id.
19. Torture Convention, supra note 9, art. 3.
20. See, e.g., id.
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prohibition of refoulement as a peremptory norm, but others allow
states to return refugees to persecution in order to safeguard their
own national security or to satisfy their obligations under extradition treaties.21 Consequently, legal scholars have struggled to reach
consensus about whether non-refoulement qualifies as jus cogens
under general international law.
A. The Refugee Convention and Refugee Protocol
Those who doubt that the non-refoulement principle qualifies as
a peremptory norm tend to emphasize the text of the Refugee
Convention.22 The canonical formulation of the non-refoulement
principle appears in Article 33(1): “No Contracting State shall expel
or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the
frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened
on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion.”23 Considered in
isolation, and bearing in mind that Article 33 is not subject to
reservation, this uncompromising language might appear to
articulate an absolute prohibition against states-parties returning
refugees to persecution. Continuing on, however, Article 33(2) limits
the scope of this protection with the following caveat:
The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be
claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for
regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he
is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a
particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.24
21. See infra Part I.B-C.
22. Refugee Convention, supra note 1.
23. Id. art. 33(1).
24. Id. art. 33(2). Significantly, Article 33(2) does not necessarily relieve states of their
non-refoulement obligation unless third-states would be unwilling to receive them. See, e.g.,
U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Exec. Comm. of the High Comm’r’s Programme, Conclusions
Adopted by the Executive Committee on the International Protection of Refugees, No. 7
(XXVIII) ¶ (c), U.N. Doc. A/10012/Add.1 (Dec. 2009) [hereinafter ExCom Conclusions]
(“[E]xpulsion measures against a refugee should only be taken in very exceptional cases and
after due consideration of all the circumstances, including the possibility for the refugee to be
admitted to a country other than his country of origin.”); Declaration on Territorial Asylum,
supra note 15, art. 3(3) (emphasizing that states must “consider the possibility of granting [a
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With similar effect, Article 1(F) excludes a forced migrant from
counting as a refugee under the Convention if “there are serious
reasons for considering that ... he has committed a crime against
peace, a war crime,” “a crime against humanity,” “a serious nonpolitical crime outside the country of refuge,” or “acts contrary to the
purposes and principles of the United Nations.”25 Although the 1967
U.N. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Protocol)
eliminated certain temporal and geographic limitations on the
Refugee Convention’s “refugee” definition, it did not abolish the
exceptions set forth in Article 1(F).26 Thus, although the Refugee
Convention and Refugee Protocol do not approve of derogation from
the non-refoulement principle during public emergencies,27 they do
envision some circumstances in which states-parties are not
obligated to apply non-refoulement to forced migrants who would
otherwise qualify as bona fide refugees.28
These features of the Refugee Convention are incompatible with
the idea that Article 33(1) endorses the prohibition of refoulement

refugee excluded from protection] ... an opportunity ... of going to another State”).
25. See Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(F).
26. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees art. I, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606
U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter Refugee Protocol] (eliminating the Refugee Convention’s geographic
and temporal restrictions).
27. The Convention’s drafters rejected an early proposal from the United Kingdom to
include a general derogation clause. See U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, THE REFUGEE
CONVENTION, 1951: THE TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES ANALYSED, WITH A COMMENTARY BY THE
LATE DR. PAUL WEIS 62-67 (1995) [hereinafter TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES]. Instead, they
approved derogation for only “provisional measures” (chiefly, detention), pending the
completion of refugee status determinations. See Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 9. See
generally U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial
Application of Non-refoulement Obligations Under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees and Its 1967 Protocol (Jan. 26, 2007) [hereinafter Advisory Opinion], https://www.
refworld.org/docid/45f17a1a4.html [https://perma.cc/H7UK-59HZ] (emphasizing “[t]he fundamental and non-derogable character of the principle of non-refoulement”).
The Convention’s travaux préparatoires contain some indications that the drafters did not
anticipate non-refoulement applying to mass migrations. See TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES, supra,
at 341-42 (“It was ruled by the President of the Conference that the Article does not apply to
mass migrations.”). No such exception appears in the Convention’s text, and the international
community has rejected this reading of the Convention for decades. See, e.g., ExCom
Conclusions, supra note 24, No. 79 (XLVII) ¶ (i) (“The principle of non-refoulement is not
subject to derogation.”); id. No. 22 (XXXII) § II(A), ¶ 2 (stressing that “[i]n all cases [of largescale influx] the fundamental principle of non-refoulement[—]including non-rejection at the
frontier[—]must be scrupulously observed”).
28. See, e.g., Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(F).
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as a peremptory norm.29 To qualify as jus cogens, international
norms may not be subject to any exceptions or limitations.30 Yet,
there is no escaping the fact that Article 33(2) allows states to
return at least some bona fide refugees to face persecution abroad.31
For example, when a state-party has reasonable cause to believe
that a refugee might commit acts of terrorism, it is not obligated to
refrain from refoulement.32 Similarly, if a refugee has committed
serious nonpolitical crimes abroad, the Refugee Convention does not
forbid extraditing her to a territory where she could face persecution.33 Even if these exceptions to the non-refoulement principle are
construed narrowly34—as emphasized in the Refugee Convention’s
drafting history35 and in guidance from the Office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)36—the fact that such exceptions appear at all calls into question whether Article 33(1) can be
characterized as codifying non-refoulement as a peremptory norm.37

29. See id. art. 33(1). Some might argue that the Refugee Convention’s exceptions do not
compromise the peremptory character of the principle of non-refoulement; rather, they merely
narrow the scope of the norm’s peremptory aspect. This definitional sleight of hand, however,
would sidestep the question with which we are primarily concerned in this Article: whether
international law ever permits states to return bona fide refugees to territories where they
would face a substantial risk of persecution.
30. See VCLT, supra note 7, art. 53.
31. Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 33(2).
32. See id.
33. See id. art. 1(F)(b); see also James C. Hathaway & Colin J. Harvey, Framing Refugee
Protection in the New World Disorder, 34 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 257, 263-64, 263 n.19 (2001)
(arguing that the primary purpose of Article 1(F) is to reduce conflicts between the Refugee
Convention and extradition treaties).
34. See, e.g., Pushpanathan v. Canada, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982, 983 (Can.) (construing Article
1(F)(c) to authorize denials of protection to those who have engaged in persecution of others
but not drug trafficking per se).
35. See TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES, supra note 27, at 342 (“As to paragraph 2 it constitutes
an exception to the general principle embodied in paragraph 1 and has, like all exceptions, to
be interpreted restrictively. Not every reason of national security may be invoked, the refugee
must constitute a danger to the national security of the country.”).
36. See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Note on the Principle of Non-refoulement, § F
(Nov. 1997), https://www.refworld.org/docid/438c6d972.html [https://perma.cc/B4V8-VBTL]
(emphasizing that Article 33(2) “is to be interpreted and implemented in a restrictive
manner”).
37. See LAURI HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS (JUS COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
262 (1988) (“If on the ground of their own security States are not prohibited [under the
Refugee Convention] from expelling or returning a refugee, what is left of the peremptory
obligation?”).
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B. Human Rights Treaties
Whether non-refoulement is a peremptory norm does not depend
solely on the Refugee Convention, however, because the Refugee
Convention is not the only international agreement that proscribes
returning refugees to persecution. Human rights treaties also
prohibit expelling or returning individuals to either torture or cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment (CIDT).38 Unlike the Refugee
Convention, international human rights law (IHRL) defines nonrefoulement in a manner that does not allow for any exceptions,
limitations, or derogations.39
Among international human rights treaties, the Torture Convention has proven to be particularly important as a safeguard against
refoulement.40 The Torture Convention states that states-parties
may not “expel, return (refouler) or extradite a person to another
State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he
would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”41 This prohibition
of refoulement is less protective than the Refugee Convention in
some respects because the harm an individual faces upon return
must rise to the level of torture—a “severe” form of “pain or
suffering”—in order to qualify for relief under the Torture Convention,42 whereas the Refugee Convention extends non-refoulement to
less intense forms of mistreatment.43 But the Torture Convention is
significantly more protective than the Refugee Convention in other
important respects. In particular, non-refoulement applies under the
Torture Convention even if a person would not qualify as a “refugee”
under the Refugee Convention44 or Refugee Protocol.45 Moreover, the
38. See infra notes 41, 49-54 and accompanying text.
39. See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
40. Torture Convention, supra note 9, art. 3(1).
41. Id.
42. Id. art. 1. The Torture Convention does not indicate whether the principle of nonrefoulement applies to CIDT.
43. See, e.g., Koval v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 798, 805-06 (7th Cir. 2005) (explaining that
economic deprivations may constitute “persecution” without threatening a person’s life or
freedom).
44. See Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(A) (defining “refugee”); Torture
Convention, supra note 9, art. 3(1) (applying the prohibition against refoulement broadly to
“people”).
45. See Refugee Protocol, supra note 26, art. I (eliminating the Refugee Convention’s
geographic and temporal restrictions).
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Torture Convention does not permit any exceptions to its prohibition
of refoulement; a person can qualify for refuge under the Torture
Convention even if she has committed war crimes in the past or
aspires to commit terrorism in the future.46 Thus, unlike the
Refugee Convention and Protocol, the Torture Convention accepts
non-refoulement as a mandatory, nonderogable, and illimitable
obligation that applies at all times and in all contexts.47
Other human rights treaties expand the scope of protection
available under IHRL. Some explicitly prohibit refoulement,
including the American Convention on Human Rights,48 the Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights),49 the Inter-American Convention to Prevent
and Punish Torture,50 and the International Convention for the
Protection of All Persons Against Enforced Disappearance.51 Others
46. See Nasirov v. Kazakhstan, CAT/C/52/D/475/2011, Decision of the Committee Against
Torture, ¶ 11.6 (May 14, 2014) (“[T]he non-refoulement principle in article 3 of the [Torture]
Convention is absolute and the fight against terrorism does not absolve the State party from
honouring its obligation to refrain from expelling or returning (‘refouler’) an individual to
another State, where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in
danger of being subjected to torture.”); Singh Sogi v. Canada, CAT/C/39/D/297/2006, Decision
of the Committee Against Torture, ¶ 10.2 (Nov. 16, 2007) (“The Committee recalls that article
3 affords absolute protection to anyone in the territory of a State party, regardless of the
person’s character or the danger the person may pose to society.”).
47. See, e.g., Comm. Against Torture, General Comment No. 4 (2017) on the Implementation of Article 3 of the Convention in the Context of Article 22, ¶¶ 8-9, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/GC/4 (Sept. 14, 2018) (affirming that “no exceptional circumstances whatsoever,
whether a state of war or ... any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of
torture,” and explaining that “[t]he principle of ‘non-refoulement’ ... is ... absolute”).
48. See American Convention, supra note 11, art. 22(8) (“In no case may an alien be
deported or returned to a country ... if in that country his right to life or personal freedom is
in danger of being violated because of his race, nationality, religion, social status, or political
opinions.”).
49. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 19(2), 2012 O.J. (C
326) 391, 399 (“No one may be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is a
serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment.”).
50. See Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture art. 13(4), opened for
signature Dec. 9, 1985, Pan-Am T.S. No. 67 (“Extradition shall not be granted nor shall the
person sought be returned when there are grounds to believe that his life is in danger, that
he will be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, or that he will be
tried by special or ad hoc courts in the requesting State.”).
51. See International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance art. 16(1), Dec. 20, 2006, 2716 U.N.T.S. 3 (“No State Party shall expel, return
(‘refouler’), surrender or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial
grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to enforced
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do not ban refoulement expressly, but international courts and
tribunals have understood non-refoulement obligations to be implicit
in states’ obligations to respect and protect particular human
rights.52 For example, the U.N. Human Rights Committee has
concluded that refoulement violates the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) when it “expose[s] individuals to
the danger of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment upon return.”53 Likewise, the European Court of
Human Rights has held that refoulement is inconsistent with the
right to life and the prohibitions against torture and CIDT as
codified in the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR).54 Under these treaties, nonrefoulement is a mandatory, nonderogable, and illimitable obligation
that is not subject to modification except by international norms of
equivalent authority.55 Indeed, the only missing ingredient for these
prohibitions to qualify as jus cogens is universality, because the

disappearance.”).
52. See, e.g., U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Compilation of General Comments and General
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, No. 20: Article 7 (Prohibition of
Torture, or Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment) ¶ 9, U.N. Doc.
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7 (May 12, 2004).
53. Id.; see also U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., No. 31, The Nature of the General Legal
Obligation on States Parties to the Covenant ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (Mar.
29, 2004) (concluding that the ICCPR “entails an obligation not to extradite, deport, expel or
otherwise remove a person from their territory, where there are substantial grounds for
believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm”).
54. See, e.g., Chahal v. United Kingdom, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1831, 1855-56 (holding that
the ECHR’s prohibition against returning a person to a territory where they face a real risk
of torture or CIDT admits no exceptions or derogations and applies even when the person
poses a threat to national security); Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at
34-35 (1989) (concluding that extradition violates the ECHR when it subjects a person to “a
real risk of exposure to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” in the receiving
state).
55. See, e.g., Chahal, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R., at 1855.
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relevant treaties have not been adopted by all states56 and are not
binding of their own force on non-parties.57
C. Customary International Law
Conventional wisdom holds that customary international law also
regulates when states may return refugees to territories where they
could encounter persecution.58 To discern the content of customary
56. For example, the Refugee Convention has 146 states-parties, and the Refugee Protocol
has 147 states-parties. See U.N. Treaty Collection, Refugees and Stateless Persons,
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsII.
aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=V-2&chapter=5&Temp=mtdsg2&clang=_en [https://perma.cc/
7XF7-FXKH]; U.N. Treaty Collection, Refugees and Stateless Persons, Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_
no=V-5&chapter=5 [https://perma.cc/K2EB-MQ3S]. Although the Torture Convention comes
closer to universal membership, it also falls short with 171 states-parties. See U.N. Treaty
Collection, Human Rights, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Unusual and
Degrading Treatment, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV9&chapter=4&lang=en [https://perma.cc/42YK-KXNQ].
57. VCLT, supra note 7, art. 34 (“A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for
a third State without its consent.”). International humanitarian law also prohibits sending
refugees to jurisdictions where they could suffer serious harm. See, e.g., Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War arts. 3, 45, 147, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (authorizing states-parties to transfer civilians only to states
that are parties to the Geneva Conventions and are willing and able to protect civilians from
torture, CIDT, and other “outrages upon personal dignity”). In particular, the Fourth Geneva
Convention provides that “[i]n no circumstances shall a protected person be transferred to a
country where he or she may have reason to fear persecution for his or her political opinions
or religious beliefs.” Id. art. 45. Similar to the Refugee Convention, however, the Fourth Convention does not define non-refoulement as a fully peremptory norm. See id. (exempting states
from this obligation when necessary to satisfy extradition requests).
58. See G.A. Res. 71/1, ¶ 24, New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (Sept. 19,
2016) (recognizing “that, in line with the principle of non-refoulement, individuals must not
be returned at borders”). Legal scholars have endorsed the customary status of the principle
of non-refoulement. See San Remo Declaration on the Principle of Non-refoulement, INT’L INST.
HUMANITARIAN L. (Sept. 2001) [hereinafter San Remo Declaration], http://iihl.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/05/Sanremo-Declaration-on-the-Principle-of-Non-Refoulement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PL28-EVVK]; GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
167-70 (2d ed. 1996); Phil C.W. Chan, The Protection of Refugees and Internally Displaced
Persons: Non-Refoulement Under Customary International Law?, 10 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 231,
232-33 (2006); Cathryn Costello & Michelle Foster, Non-refoulement as Custom and Jus
Cogens? Putting the Prohibition to the Test, 46 NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 273, 300 (2015); Elihu
Lauterpacht & Daniel Bethlehem, The Scope and Content of the Principle of Non-refoulement:
Opinion, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 87, 149 (Erika Feller et al. eds.,
2003). But see James C. Hathaway, Leveraging Asylum, 45 TEX. INT’L L.J. 503, 506 (2010)
(“[T]here is no duty of non-refoulement that binds all states as a matter of customary
international law.”).
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international law, international lawyers traditionally have looked
for two elements: (1) general state practice in conformity with or
affirming a norm and (2) general international acceptance of the
norm’s legal character (opinio juris).59 Applying these criteria, most
legal scholars have concluded that customary international law
prohibits refoulement for any persons who would qualify for
protection under the Refugee Convention, the Refugee Protocol, and
the Torture Convention.60 But the scope of the customary nonrefoulement principle may sweep even more broadly. Over the past
four decades, human rights discourse has exerted a powerful
gravitational pull on the customary norms of IRL.61 As a result, the
idea that states may lawfully return refugees to persecution based
on extradition requests or national security concerns no longer
commands universal acceptance among states today.
This shift in customary international law has emerged gradually
over time. For at least a decade and a half after the Refugee
Convention entered force, states embraced the Convention’s
guidance that domestic national security and transnational law
enforcement were legitimate legal justifications for refoulement. In
the 1966 Bangkok Declaration on the Status and Treatment of
Refugees, states from Africa and Asia confirmed that the prohibition
of refoulement did not apply
when there are reasonable grounds to believe the person’s
presence is a danger to the national security or public order of
the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a
final judgement of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a
danger to the community of that country.62

59. Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice art. 38, Dec. 16, 1920, 6
L.N.T.S. 390.
60. See supra note 58.
61. See Alice Edwards, Human Rights, Refugees, and the Right ‘To Enjoy’ Asylum, 17 INT’L
J. REFUGEE L. 293, 294-96 (2005) (discussing the growing momentum and importance of IHRL
in “refugee discourse” in the decades since the Refugee Convention).
62. Asian-African Legal Consultative Org., Bangkok Principles on the Status and
Treatment of Refugees, art. III(1) (Dec. 31, 1966) [hereinafter Bangkok Principles], https://
www.refworld.org/docid/3de5f2d52.html [https://perma.cc/GG9Y-U9S9].
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The following year, the U.N. General Assembly’s Declaration on
Territorial Asylum asserted that states could withhold non-refoulement “for overriding reasons of national security or in order to
safeguard the population, as in the case of a mass influx of persons.”63 Both declarations expressed states’ understanding that
international law did not forbid refoulement when this step was
necessary to safeguard certain important national interests.64
This global consensus against treating non-refoulement as a
peremptory norm eventually began to show cracks, starting in Latin
America. In 1969, states in the Western Hemisphere declined to
recognize any exceptions, limitations, or grounds for derogation
from the non-refoulement principle enshrined in the American
Convention on Human Rights.65 Ten Latin American states later
reaffirmed this principle in the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on
Refugees.66 In the 2014 Brazil Declaration and Plan of Action, states
from Latin America and the Caribbean asserted with exceptional
clarity “the jus cogens character of the principle of non-refoulement.”67 At least among Latin American states, therefore, opinio
juris supports the peremptory character of the principle of nonrefoulement.
These developments have not escaped the attention of the broader
international community. In 1982, the Executive Committee of the
High Commissioner’s Programme (Executive Committee), an international deliberative body composed of state representatives,
observed that “the principle of non-refoulement ... was progressively
acquiring the character of a peremptory rule of international law.”68
63. Declaration on Territorial Asylum, supra note 15, art. 3(2).
64. See id.; Bangkok Principles, supra note 62, art. III(1).
65. See American Convention, supra note 11, art. 22(8) (“In no case may an alien be
deported or returned to a country, regardless of whether or not it is his country of origin, if
in that country his right to life or personal freedom is in danger of being violated because of
his race, nationality, religion, social status, or political opinions.”). The same year, the
Organization for African Unity did not include an equivalent of the Refugee Convention’s
Article 33(2) in its Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, but
it did adopt the equivalent of Article 1(F). Compare African Refugee Convention, supra note
11, art. I(4)-(5), with Refugee Convention, supra note 1, arts. 1(F), 33(2).
66. See Cartagena Declaration, supra note 11, § III(5).
67. Brazil Declaration, supra note 11, at 2.
68. ExCom Conclusions, supra note 24, No. 25 (XXXIII) ¶ (b); see also U.N. High Comm’r
for Refugees, Exec. Comm’r’s Programme, Note on International Protection (Submitted by the
High Commissioner), Thirty-Fifth Session, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/643 (Aug. 9, 1984)
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Because Executive Committee “[c]onclusions reflect the consensus
of States, acting in an advisory capacity where issues of protection
and non-refoulement are addressed internationally,” they “carry a
disproportionate weight in the formation of [international] custom”
on refugee protection.69 The fact that the Executive Committee
characterized non-refoulement as a norm “progressively acquiring”
peremptory status suggests that the international community as a
whole was open to embracing this result at the time.70 Yet, a dose of
caution is also in order: although non-refoulement may have been
“progressively acquiring the character of a peremptory norm of
international law,” the fact remains that the Executive Committee
apparently concluded that this transformation was not yet
complete.71
Fast-forward to the present, and legal scholars continue to debate
whether, or to what extent, customary international law recognizes
non-refoulement as a peremptory norm. Conventional wisdom holds
that the prohibition against refoulement to torture qualifies as a
customary norm of jus cogens, such that it applies even to states
that are not parties to the Torture Convention.72 Beyond that relatively uncontroversial principle, however, scholarly consensus has
proven to be elusive. Some publicists have argued that the prohibition against refoulement to CIDT also qualifies as jus cogens under
customary international law,73 but that proposition does not enjoy
universal acceptance.74 Whether less grave forms of persecution,
[hereinafter ExCom, Thirty-Fifth Session] (asserting that non-refoulement “is progressively
acquiring the character of a peremptory norm of international law”).
69. Jean Allain, The Jus Cogens Nature of Non-refoulement, 13 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 533,
539 (2001); see also Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra note 58, at 148 (“Conclusions of the
Executive Committee can, in our view, be taken as expressions of opinion which are broadly
representative of the views of the international community.”). An important caveat is that
only forty states participated in the Executive Committee that produced Conclusion 25,
though this group included a relatively diverse cross section of the international community.
See Executive Committee’s Membership by Year of Admission of Members, UNHCR, https://
www.unhcr.org/en-us/excom/announce/40112e984/excom-membership-date-admissionmembers.html [https://perma.cc/UD2L-NMSZ].
70. ExCom, Thirty-Fifth Session, supra note 68, ¶ 15.
71. See id.
72. See Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra note 58, at 161 (“There is consensus that the
prohibition of torture constitutes a rule of customary international law.”).
73. See, e.g., id. at 150, 163-64.
74. See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 58, at 168-69.
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such as discrimination in public entitlements or employment, trigger peremptory non-refoulement obligations is more controversial
still.75
This diversity of viewpoints is perhaps to be expected, considering
the challenging empirical questions that arise whenever international lawyers seek to identify the state practice and opinio juris of
refugee protection.76 Does a substantial supermajority of specially
affected states actually accept the idea that refoulement to persecution is never permissible under customary international law? Or do
most states outside of Latin America and the Caribbean continue to
accept the Refugee Convention’s exceptions and limitations as lex
specialis? Does general state practice actually support the proposition that states may not withhold protection from persecution under
any circumstances? Or do states persist in returning refugees to
territories where they have well-founded fears of persecution, while
publicly defending such measures as legally permissible based on
national security threats, refugees’ prior criminal acts, or the
administrative and financial burdens associated with mass influxes?
Assembling the evidence and formulating an interpretive framework adequate to provide credible answers to these questions is no
mean feat.
Among scholars who have taken up this challenge, Cathryn
Costello and Michelle Foster have made the most powerful case in
favor of an expansive conception of non-refoulement as a peremptory norm of customary international law.77 To determine whether
non-refoulement is a peremptory norm, they apply a “customary
75. Compare Exec. Comm. of the High Comm’r’s Programme, Note on International
Protection (Submitted by the High Commissioner), Thirty-Sixth Session, ¶ 17, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.96/660 (July 23, 1985) (“The fundamental principle of non-refoulement ... has come to
be characterized as a peremptory norm of international law.”), with Lauterpacht &
Bethlehem, supra note 58, at 150 (“Overriding reasons of national security or public safety
will permit a State to derogate from the principle [of non-refoulement] in circumstances in
which the threat [of persecution] does not equate to and would not be regarded as being on
a par with a danger of torture or ... other non-derogable customary principles of human
rights.”).
76. Cf. Ryan M. Scoville, Finding Customary International Law, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1893,
1896-97 (2016) (highlighting difficulties judges face in determining state practice and opinio
juris).
77. See generally Costello & Foster, supra note 58. Other endorsements of an expansive
peremptory principle of non-refoulement include ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, PEREMPTORY
NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 54-57 (2006), and Allain, supra note 69.
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international law plus” theory, according to which customary
norms qualify as jus cogens if states have manifest widespread
support for the norm having this distinctive status.78 Surveying
multilateral treaties, U.N. General Assembly resolutions, Executive
Committee conclusions, and other evidence of state practice and
opinio juris, Costello and Foster make a compelling case that the
principle of non-refoulement has become firmly embedded in
customary international law.79 Costello and Foster then lean heavily
on General Assembly resolutions and Executive Committee
conclusions to establish that states now accept non-refoulement as
a peremptory norm.80 Although Costello and Foster acknowledge
that the General Assembly and the Executive Committee do not
regularly use the words “peremptory” or “jus cogens” to describe
non-refoulement,81 they deem it “highly pertinent” that states
consistently refer to non-refoulement as having a “fundamental
character” or as a “‘cardinal’ or ‘fundamental principle.’”82 Reasoning
that these expressions reflect jus cogens, Costello and Foster
conclude that non-refoulement has ripened into a peremptory norm
under general international law.83
This argument has notable weaknesses. The fact that states have
accepted non-refoulement as a fundamental feature of international legal order does not necessarily mean that the norm has a peremptory and non-derogable character. By way of comparison, few
would dispute the General Assembly’s description of freedom of
expression, peaceful assembly, and association as “fundamental” to
78. See Costello & Foster, supra note 58, at 306-07 (citing John Tasioulas, Custom, Jus
Cogens, and Human Rights, in CUSTOM’S FUTURE 95 (Curtis A. Bradley ed., 2016)).
79. See id. at 282-304.
80. Id. at 309.
81. With the exception, of course, of Executive Committee Conclusion 25, which uses this
language only tentatively to describe lex ferenda that might mature eventually into lex lata.
See id. at 308-09.
82. Id. at 309 (citing ExCom Conclusions, supra note 24, No. 99 (LV) ¶ (1); id. No. 94 (LIII)
¶ (c)(i); id. No. 16 (XXXI) ¶ (e); id. No. 74 (XLV) ¶ (g); id. No. 33 (XXXV) ¶ 87 (1)(c); id. No. 22
(XXXII) § II(A), ¶ (2); id. No. 21 (XXXII) ¶ 57 (1)(f)). Costello and Foster also note in passing
that a few domestic and regional courts have characterized non-refoulement as a peremptory
norm. See id. at 308.
83. Id. at 309 (“[I]t appears that non-refoulement is ripe for recognition as jus cogens.”);
see also James C. Simeon, What Is the Future of Non-refoulement in International Refugee
Law?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW 183, 192 (Satvinder Singh
Juss ed., 2019).
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international public order,84 but all of these norms are subject to
limitation and derogation under IHRL.85 Moreover, to the extent
that the international community has formulated the non-refoulement principle differently on different occasions, one might reasonably question, with James Hathaway, whether there is a coherent
norm around which opinio juris might catalyze into jus cogens (other than, perhaps, the prohibition of return to torture).86 At a
minimum, these considerations counsel caution in assessing whether international opinio juris accepts non-refoulement as a peremptory and nonderogable norm.
Skeptics have argued further that state practice does not support
the idea that customary international law enshrines an expansive
peremptory principle of non-refoulement. National courts sometimes
impose parsimonious interpretations on Convention and Protocol
protections, limiting the scope of the non-refoulement principle in a
manner that calls into question its status as a peremptory and
nonderogable norm.87 Aoife Duffy also contends that the prevalence
of “‘terrorist’ exceptions to the prohibition on refoulement” in national laws and policies “indicates that the goal of acquiring peremptory status for the principle of non-refoulement in [customary]

84. G.A. Res. 73/173, ¶ 2, Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Including the Rights to Peaceful Assembly and Freedom of Association (Dec. 17,
2018).
85. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 4(1), Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (permitting derogation from certain Convention rights,
including freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, and association); id. art. 19(3) (providing
that freedom of expression may be limited in the interest of respecting “the rights or
reputations of others” and “[f]or the protection of national security or of public order (ordre
public), or of public health or morals”); id. art. 21 (same for peaceful assembly); id. art. 22(2)
(same for association). To be sure, each of these norms might have a nonderogable core, see
Tasioulas, supra note 78, at 114-15, but this does not mean the larger derogable aspects of
these norms are not fundamental to international legal order.
86. See Hathaway, supra note 58, at 510 (“There is, in short, no common acceptance of the
duty of non-refoulement related to any particular class of persons or type of risk, much less
to their combined beneficiary class.”).
87. See, e.g., Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155, 159 (1993) (concluding that the
Protocol’s prohibition of refoulement does not apply to maritime interdiction on the high seas).
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international law has yet to be reached.”88 Hathaway,89 Rene Bruin
and Kees Wouters,90 and William Schabas offer similar assessments.91 The influential 2001 San Remo Declaration on the Principle
of Non-refoulement, a document crafted by a panel of experts in
cooperation with UNHCR, likewise characterizes the principle of
non-refoulement as being subject to “legitimate exception[s]”—
presumably, those set forth in Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention.92 In short, despite the fact that some regional treaty regimes
and declarations endorse non-refoulement as a peremptory norm,
legal experts have yet to reach consensus about whether nonrefoulement has attained this status under a “customary international law plus” theory of jus cogens.93
To be sure, none of these grounds for hesitation conclusively
disproves that non-refoulement is a peremptory norm. They do
suggest, however, that other arguments and approaches may play
a productive role in selecting and assessing the evidence of state
practice and opinio juris relevant to customary international law’s
recognition of IRL’s non-refoulement principle as a peremptory
norm.

88. Aoife Duffy, Expulsion to Face Torture? Non-refoulement in International Law, 20
INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 373, 389-90 (2008) (concluding that “arguments put forth by the authors
of the Sanremo Declaration and the UNHCR Executive Committee, that non-refoulement has
acquired a jus cogens status, are less than convincing,” given the exclusion clauses of Article
1(F)).
89. See Hathaway, supra note 58, at 516 (arguing that “there is a pervasive—perhaps
even dominant—state practice that denies in one way or another the right to be protected
against refoulement”).
90. See Rene Bruin & Kees Wouters, Terrorism and the Non-derogability of Nonrefoulement, 15 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 5, 26 (2003) (“The major practical problem remains the
burden of proof to be able to actually characterize the obligation of non-refoulement as a
peremptory norm of general international law.”).
91. See William A. Schabas, Non-refoulement, in EXPERT WORKSHOP ON HUMAN RIGHTS
AND INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN COUNTER-TERRORISM 20, 27 n.22 (2006) (“The
arguments that non-refoulement is a jus cogens norm are not particularly convincing.”).
92. San Remo Declaration, supra note 58, at 2; see Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art.
33(2).
93. Even some scholars who endorse a customary aspect to the principle of nonrefoulement have concluded that the norm is not peremptory. See, e.g., Lauterpacht &
Bethlehem, supra note 58, at 132-33.
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D. Synthesis
In sum, the legal landscape of international refugee protection is
highly complex and fractured. Applying conventional criteria, there
are limits to what scholars can assert with confidence about the
status of non-refoulement as a peremptory norm under treaties and
customary international law. In at least some respects, the principle
of non-refoulement indisputably qualifies as jus cogens. The
prohibition against exposing a person to torture is undoubtedly a
peremptory norm that applies to all states in all contexts. However,
it is less clear whether non-refoulement to persecution also qualifies
as a peremptory norm. Some regional treaties endorse this principle
as jus cogens, but the Refugee Convention does not go so far, and
legal academics have divided over whether non-refoulement to
persecution has become a peremptory norm under customary
international law. This may be due, at least in part, to the fact that
state practice and opinio juris on this question are amenable to
different interpretations. For international lawyers who espouse a
“custom international law plus” theory of jus cogens, it might be
tempting to conclude that the non-refoulement principle remains in
a Sisyphean purgatory, forever “progressively acquiring” the
character of jus cogens (lex ferenda) without ever quite attaining
enough state practice and opinio juris to put the matter to rest (lex
lata).
Our goal in the remainder of this Article is threefold. First, we
aim to develop a fiduciary and dual commissions theory of IRL that
ultimately may serve as an interpretive prism congenial to the
selection and qualification of state practice and opinio juris
supportive of recognizing non-refoulement as a customary norm.94
Second, we deploy this theory to explain why the very legality of the
international legal order depends on its recognition of non-refoulement as a peremptory norm. And third, as we develop this theory,
we present a normative case in favor of the international community

94. In developing this fiduciary and dual commissions theory of IRL, our methodology is
inspired by Rawls’s idea of “reflective equilibrium.” JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 20
(1971). The theory aspires to explain the conceptual and normative basis for IRL’s central
features while also offering resources to enable constructive critique.
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recognizing that the duty of non-refoulement has a jus cogens
character.
II. THE CASE FOR RECOGNIZING NON-REFOULEMENT AS A
PEREMPTORY NORM
In this Part, we first consider a number of arguments that oppose
the peremptory status of the duty of non-refoulement. We then
elaborate our dual commissions theory of IRL, explaining how the
dual commissions theory is able to meet the skeptics’ arguments
while providing a positive account of the peremptory character of
non-refoulement.
A. Skepticism
Scholars who resist characterizing non-refoulement as a customary and peremptory norm fall into two camps. Some accept that
customary international law enshrines a general principle of nonrefoulement, but they question whether states have a moral or legal
duty to observe this principle when vital sovereign interests, such
as national security or public health, are imperiled.95 Others argue
that there are no rational grounds to suppose that states have a
moral duty of non-refoulement at all, and therefore that there is no
good reason to attribute to state actors a motive to act in accordance
with such a duty.96
Prominent arguments against the peremptory status of nonrefoulement raise four concerns: the special loyalty that states owe
their citizens; the value of local self-determination and freedom of
association; the presumption against limitations on sovereign
discretion found in international legal sources such as the S.S.
“Lotus”;97 and Schmittian conceptions of sovereignty under which

95. E.g., Bruin & Wouters, supra note 90, at 26; Duffy, supra note 88, at 389.
96. E.g., David Miller, Immigration: The Case for Limits, in CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN
APPLIED ETHICS 363, 368-72 (Andrew I. Cohen & Christopher Heath Wellman eds., 2013);
Christopher Heath Wellman, Immigration and Freedom of Association, 119 ETHICS 109, 109
(2008); cf. Hathaway, supra note 58, at 506 (concluding that there is no customary duty of
non-refoulement).
97. S.S. “Lotus” (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 19 (Sept. 7).

1092

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:1067

the sovereign is understood as “an uncommanded commander”98
with unfettered discretion, particularly in times of crisis.99 In this
Section, we sketch various arguments that call on these considerations. Some of these arguments are from political theory and
philosophy. They are nonetheless germane to conventional inquiry
into customary and peremptory norms, such as Costello and Foster’s
“custom plus” theory, because this is, inter alia, an interpretive
inquiry into whether certain acts of states that conform to aspiring
customary and peremptory norms do so because state actors believe
themselves to be under a legal obligation to comply with them
(customary norms) or to comply with them without the possibility
of limitation or derogation (peremptory norms).100
1. Special Loyalty
Some scholars argue that states owe to their citizens a special
form of loyalty that invariably stands in tension with a peremptory
norm of non-refoulement. We are not referring to realists of
international relations, such as Hans Morgenthau, who claim that
the state’s exclusive concern is the well-being of its own people and
for whom the very idea of a customary international legal obligation
is suspect.101 Rather, we are referring to more moderate thinkers
who recognize that states owe some duties to outsiders but who
think that the state’s primary and most important obligations are
to its citizens.102 Thus, in the event of conflict, the state’s duties to

98. See the discussion of John Austin in Ronald Dworkin, A New Philosophy for International Law, 41 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 2, 3 (2013).
99. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY 5-15 (George Schwab trans., 2005) (1934)
(defining state sovereignty and its superiority to law).
100. See Costello & Foster, supra note 58, at 276, 281-82, 316. We recognize, of course, that
states act for self-interested reasons as well as (sometimes) from a sense of duty.
101. See, e.g., HANS J. MORGENTHAU, SCIENTIFIC MAN VS. POWER POLITICS 115-17, 119, 121
(1946); John R. Bolton, Is There Really “Law” in International Affairs?, 10 TRANSNAT’L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 4-7 (2000) (disputing the existence of international legal obligations on
nationalist grounds); see also ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND SELFDETERMINATION 35-37 (2004) (dubbing Morgenthau a “Fiduciary Realist” and critiquing this
form of realism for disregarding basic moral obligations that bind a person whether she acts
for herself or another).
102. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 96, at 368-72.
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its citizens generally prevail, and therefore the idea that nonrefoulement is a peremptory duty faces an uphill climb.103
David Miller’s views are characteristic of this more moderate
nationalism. Miller argues that states may justifiably limit
immigration based on their members’ interest in maintaining and
controlling their public culture, as well as their interest in population control.104 He compares the outsider’s interest in permanent
migration to another state with his possible interest in acquiring an
Aston Martin.105 He is, however, prepared to make a qualified
exception for refugees, on the grounds that individuals “whose basic
rights are being threatened or violated ... have the right to move to
somewhere that offers them greater security.”106 It follows, Miller
says, that states have a “[p]rima facie” obligation to admit refugees,
a class he specifies more broadly than the Refugee Convention to
include persons “deprived of rights to subsistence, basic healthcare,
and so on.”107
But the prima facie obligation to take in refugees comes with
three important qualifications. First, as Miller understands it, the
state’s obligation is to provide refuge only for so long as the threat
to human rights persists.108 Following James Hathaway and
Alexander Neve, Miller asserts that refugees may “be asked to
return to their original country of citizenship when the threat has
passed.”109 Second, states need not take in refugees themselves if
asylum seekers can be sent to a place where their “basic rights” are
not threatened (for example, refugee camps in the South, or as
Miller characterizes them, “safety zones for refugees close to their

103. Id. at 373.
104. Id. at 368-72.
105. Id. at 364, 366.
106. Id. at 372.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. (citing James C. Hathaway & R. Alexander Neve, Making International Refugee
Law Relevant Again: A Proposal for Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection, 10 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 115 (1997)). The sense in which refugees are to be “asked” is euphemistic. As
with Hathaway and Neve’s proposal, Miller’s view is that states are entitled to forcibly deport
asylum seekers if the threat to their human rights in their country of origin recedes within
a lesser period of time than it is reasonable to keep them without permanent status and in
limbo. Id. In previous work, we have argued in favor of a durable right to asylum. See
CRIDDLE & FOX-DECENT, supra note 16, at 276-81.
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homes”).110 Third, and perhaps most importantly from the point of
view of an inquiry into non-refoulement, Miller insists that all states
are entitled to decide for themselves how to respond to individual
requests for asylum.111 “Each state,” Miller says, “is at some point
entitled to say that it has done enough to cope with the refugee
crisis.”112 An implication of every state having this prerogative,
Miller concedes, is that “there can be no guarantee that every bona
fide refugee will find a state willing to take him or her in.”113
The prerogative over bona fide refugee admissions that Miller
supports is inconsistent with a peremptory duty of non-refoulement,
because the very existence of such a duty entails the denial of such
a prerogative. Miller would therefore resist ascribing to states a
peremptory legal duty of non-refoulement.
2. Self-Determination
Arguments similar to Miller’s are sometimes said to follow from
a state’s freedom of association and related right to self-determination. Among the boldest claims in the literature on migration is
Christopher Wellman’s “stark conclusion that every legitimate state
has the right to close its doors to all potential immigrants, even
refugees desperately seeking asylum from incompetent or corrupt
political regimes that are either unable or unwilling to protect their
citizens’ basic moral rights.”114 Wellman argues that states, like
individuals and groups generally, enjoy freedom of association.115
For individuals, Wellman’s favored case of freedom of association is
matrimony: individuals are free to choose whom they marry, but to
enjoy freedom of association fully in this context “one must also
have the discretion to reject the proposal of any given suitor and
even to remain single indefinitely if one chooses.”116 For groups,

110. Miller, supra note 96, at 372.
111. Id. at 373. In later work, Miller subscribes to the principle of non-refoulement, though
with at least the first two qualifications firmly in place. See DAVID MILLER, STRANGERS IN
OUR MIDST: THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF IMMIGRATION 76-93 (2016).
112. Miller, supra note 96, at 373.
113. Id.
114. Wellman, supra note 96, at 109.
115. Id. at 110-11.
116. Id. at 110.

2021]

THE AUTHORITY OF INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW

1095

freedom of association includes the right to exclude so as to control
the group’s membership, which in the case of legitimate states
implies an entitlement “to exclude all foreigners from its political
community.”117 For Wellman, freedom of association is “a central
component of the more general right to self-determination,” so that
“a state cannot fully enjoy the right to political self-determination
unless its rights to freedom of association are respected.”118
Wellman argues that a state’s right to exclude applies “even in
cases of asylum seekers desperately in need of a political safe
haven.”119 His proposal for responding to refugee crises is humanitarian intervention: “one cannot ship justice in a box, but one can
intervene, militarily if necessary, in an unjust political environment
to ensure that those currently vulnerable to the state are made safe
in their homelands.”120 He uses the Kurds in northern Iraq as an
example of how this might work in practice.121 One way to alleviate
the Kurds’ suffering, he says, would be through their resettlement
elsewhere, but another would be to create a safe haven and no-fly
zone.122 Receiving states owe the Kurds and others similarly
situated a duty to help, but “it is a disjunctive duty” they can fulfill
either by granting asylum to those in desperate need or through
humanitarian intervention.123 Wellman qualifies in a footnote that
because interventions typically take time, receiving states “should
not return the refugees to their home state (at least without

117. Id. at 111.
118. Id. at 113 n.5.
119. Id. at 128.
120. Id. at 129.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. Wellman does not venture a guess at the proportion of refugee cases that
resembles the Kurds, nor how intervention might work when the refugee-producing state is
not easily dominated by Western powers (for example, China or Iran), nor how intervention
is to occur when the persecution is of a kind that plainly does not warrant military
intervention (for example, periodic and mild stifling of political opinion). He cites with
approval a passage from Miller that presents an additional option for when humanitarian
intervention is impractical: receiving states “must help [refugees] move to other communities
where their lives will [be] better.” Id. at 129-30; Miller, supra note 96, at 368. For Miller, and
presumably for Wellman, “other communities” include refugee camps or “safety zones for
refugees close to their homes.” Miller, supra note 96, at 372. When Wellman presents his
closed-border view most directly, it is without qualification. See supra text accompanying
notes 113-18.
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protecting them) until the intervention is successfully completed.”124
Admittedly, this qualification may bring Wellman’s proposal within
a narrow interpretation of the duty of non-refoulement, although it
is consistent with receiving states deporting refugees to internment
camps while the intervention unfolds.
3. The Lotus Doctrine
The wide discretion Wellman attributes to states is reflected in
well-known doctrine from international law. In the famous Lotus
case, a majority of the Permanent Court of International Justice
held that “[t]he rules of law binding upon States ... emanate from
their own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages
generally accepted as expressing principles of law.... Restrictions
upon the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed.”125
The Court declared that states enjoy “a wide measure of discretion
which is only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules; as
regards other cases, every State remains free to adopt the principles
which it regards as best and most suitable.”126 Thus, Prosper Weil
notes laconically, the Lotus doctrine is simply that “whatever is not
explicitly prohibited by international law is permitted.”127
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has reiterated the
permissive Lotus doctrine in subsequent cases. For example, in the
Haya de la Torre case, Colombia petitioned the ICJ for direction
regarding whether it was legally bound to surrender a Peruvian,
Haya de la Torre, who was seeking exile within Colombia’s embassy
in Peru.128 Peru sought to take him into custody for prosecution of

124. Wellman, supra note 96, at 129 n.26. This qualification is arguably inconsistent with
Wellman’s brasher claim that states can close their doors to “refugees desperately seeking
asylum,” because in these cases, presumably, successful intervention has not yet occurred. Id.
at 109.
125. S.S. “Lotus” (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7).
126. Id. at 19.
127. Prosper Weil, “The Court Cannot Conclude Definitively...” Non Liquet Revisited, 36
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 109, 112 (1997). But see An Hertogen, Letting Lotus Bloom, 26 EUR.
J. INT’L L. 901, 904 (2015) (arguing that Lotus has been misinterpreted and that the key to
understanding the case lies in the court’s commitment to the “co-existence of independent
communities”).
128. Haya de la Torre (Colom. v. Peru), Judgment, 1951 I.C.J. 71, 73 (June 13).
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alleged criminal offenses.129 The court found that the governing
Convention on Asylum (Havana 1928) “does not give a complete
answer to the question of the manner in which an asylum shall be
terminated.”130 The court then concluded that “[t]he silence of the
Convention implies that it was intended to leave the adjustment of
the consequences of this situation to decisions inspired by considerations of convenience or of simple political expediency.”131 In the
instant case, this meant that “extra-legal factors ... and the spirit of
the Havana Convention” weighed decisively in favor of Colombia’s
refusal to deliver Haya de la Torre to Peru.132 According to the ICJ,
the absence of an express prohibition or prescription meant that
Colombia had the prerogative to deny Peru’s request.133
A lesson that skeptics of a peremptory duty of non-refoulement
might draw is that in the absence of an express legal norm establishing the peremptory status of the duty, states remain free to
derogate from it. For scholars who doubt the peremptory status of
the duty of non-refoulement, such as Duffy,134 Hathaway,135 Bruin
and Wouters,136 and Schabas,137 cases such as Lotus and Haya de la
Torre disclose a view of sovereignty that denotes a default principle
of robust state autonomy. On this understanding of sovereignty,
proponents of a peremptory duty of non-refoulement face a heavy
burden to show that state practice and opinio juris displace the
default principle of state autonomy in a way that reveals the duty
of non-refoulement’s peremptory status.
4. Schmittian Sovereignty
In the decades prior to Lotus and Haya de la Torre, Carl Schmitt
developed a conception of sovereignty that gave the sovereign a
qualitatively wider discretion still, a conception of sovereignty that

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 77-78.
Id. at 80.
Id. at 81.
Id.
Id. at 83.
Duffy, supra note 88, at 389.
Hathaway, supra note 58, at 506.
Bruin & Wouters, supra note 90, at 26.
Schabas, supra note 91, at 27 n.22.
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would return to prominence in the years following 9/11.138 Schmitt
begins Political Theology with the declaration that “[s]overeign is he
who decides on the exception.”139 By this, Schmitt means that the
sovereign is the person politically capable of making and enforcing
a decision about whether there is an emergency, as well as the
person entitled to determine what must be done to address it.140
Because “[t]he precise details of an emergency cannot be anticipated, nor can one spell out ... how it is to be eliminated,” the power
to decide on the exception “must necessarily be unlimited.”141
Schmitt premised this claim on the idea that legality consists of
exclusively two elements: general norms and particular decisions.142
Legal norms, however, cannot exhaustively anticipate the shape an
emergency will take nor what must be done to eliminate it.143 And
because, for Schmitt, only decisions on the exception are capable of
safeguarding the “normal” legal order, he could conclude that “[l]ike
every other order, the legal order rests on a decision and not on a
norm.”144 That is, even during normal times the sovereign retains an
unlimited power to declare and deal with emergencies.145 By virtue
of this power, the sovereign “stands outside the normally valid legal
system,” but also “belongs to it, for it is he who must decide whether
the constitution needs to be suspended in its entirety.”146
Schmitt has had enormous influence on scholarship and policy
related to emergency powers since 9/11.147 Giorgio Agamben’s State
138. Our discussion of Schmitt draws on our discussion of his theory of sovereignty in Evan
J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, Human Rights, Emergencies, and the Rule of Law, 34 HUM.
RTS. Q. 39, 42-44 (2012).
139. SCHMITT, supra note 99, at 5.
140. See id. at 5-7.
141. Id. at 6-7.
142. Id. at 10.
143. Id. at 7.
144. Id. at 10.
145. See id.
146. Id. at 7.
147. See, e.g., GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION 1-4 (Kevin Attell trans., 2005); OREN
GROSS & FIONNUALA NÍ AOLÁIN, LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIS 164-70 (2006) (drawing on Schmitt’s
work to develop a theory of sovereign prerogative to take extralegal action during
emergencies); ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE 38-39 (2007)
(identifying Schmitt as “[t]he philosopher-jurist most often invoked in discussions of
emergencies” and deploying Schmittian arguments to defend security-based restrictions on
civil liberties); Austin Sarat, Introduction: Toward New Conceptions of the Relationship of
Law and Sovereignty Under Conditions of Emergency, in SOVEREIGNTY, EMERGENCY, LEGALITY
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of Exception, for example, applies Schmitt’s ideas to war-on-terror
measures adopted by the Bush administration and maintains that
the state of exception tends increasingly to appear as the dominant
“paradigm of government” in contemporary politics.148 Agamben
points to the “military order” issued by President George W. Bush
on November 13, 2001, authorizing, inter alia, “indefinite detention”
of noncitizens suspected of terrorism and “trial by ‘military commissions.’”149 He observes that President Bush’s order
radically erases any legal status of the individual.... Neither
prisoners nor persons accused, but simply “detainees,” they are
the object of a pure de facto rule, of a detention that is indefinite
not only in the temporal sense but in its very nature as well,
since it is entirely removed from the law and judicial
oversight.150

The Schmittian implication is that the U.S. President, similar to
Schmitt’s sovereign, has absolute and unfettered power to identify
and confront perceived threats to national security.151 For governments declaring emergencies based on the COVID-19 pandemic, the
Schmittian framework provides a tested resource to deny that the
duty of non-refoulement has peremptory status (or any other applicability, except at the sufferance of the sovereign).
In the next Section we develop a dual commissions theory of IRL
that aims to meet the skeptical challenges posed by Schmitt,
moderate nationalism (Miller), the alleged implications of freedom
of association and self-determination (Wellman), and the purportedly wide discretionary authority international law confers on states
(Lotus).

1, 2 (Austin Sarat ed., 2010).
148. AGAMBEN, supra note 147, at 8-9.
149. Id. at 3; Military Order of November 13, 2001—Detention, Treatment, and Trial of
Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,834 (Nov. 13,
2001).
150. AGAMBEN, supra note 147, at 3-4.
151. Cf. SCHMITT, supra note 99, at 6-7.
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B. The Dual Commissions Theory
Under the dual commissions theory, states are understood to occupy two juridically salient fiduciary positions and thereby to have
two juridically salient commissions.152 One of these commissions is
local, whereas the other is global.153 Locally, the state is entrusted
by international law to govern its people domestically, as well as to
represent them and advocate for their interests internationally.154
Under this theory, the “people” include all citizens and noncitizens
within the state’s territory and otherwise amenable to the state’s
jurisdiction.155 In the domestic sphere, the special loyalty states owe
to their people is reflected in the comprehensive international
human rights obligations that flow from treaty-based and customary
IHRL.156 States owe to their people, but not others, particularized
human rights obligations related to, for example, freedom of
expression, freedom of association, and freedom of religion,157 as well
as socioeconomic human rights related to goods such as housing,
education, and health care.158 In the international domain, international law entrusts states with a commission to make decisions
about war and peace on behalf of their people and likewise to
negotiate hard for their people in negotiations over trade and
commerce.159
The state’s global commission is categorically distinct, notwithstanding that it operates at a supranational level. The global
commission is a joint mandate shared with all other states to act
with due regard for the common interests and patrimony of
152. Elements of this discussion draw on prior work. See CRIDDLE & FOX-DECENT, supra
note 16, at 243-82; Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, Guardians of Legal Order: The Dual
Commissions of Public Fiduciaries, in FIDUCIARY GOVERNMENT 67 (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds.,
2018).
153. See Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 152, at 70.
154. See id. at 91.
155. See CRIDDLE & FOX-DECENT, supra note 16, at 13.
156. For discussion, see id. at 77-122.
157. See id. at 107 (outlining formal criteria that explain why a particular human right is
owed by a given state to those under its authority).
158. See id. at 113-15 (explaining why the fiduciary theory also imposes positive obligations
to protect socioeconomic human rights such as education and health care).
159. See Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 152, at 92 (“[S]tates bear a first-order
responsibility under international law to advocate for the rights and interests of their
particular beneficiaries.”).
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humanity, such as the earth’s surface and climate.160 This commission arises from the state’s position—a position common to all
states—as a fiduciary of humanity with respect to humanity’s
common interests and patrimony.161 Eyal Benvenisti characterizes
the state in this position as a “trustee[ ] of humanity.”162 George
Scelle likewise emphasized national authorities’ dual function
(“dédoublement fonctionnel”) as agents of both the national and
international legal orders.163 On our view, when international law
allocates to states collective responsibility and joint authority to
regulate certain transnational or global public goods on behalf of
humanity (for example, the deep ocean floor or international peace
and security), states as fiduciaries of humanity occupy positions of
joint stewardship with other states.164 In this role, the transnational
or global commission of states is to regulate those goods multilaterally rather than unilaterally.165
The argument for joint stewardship proceeds from the consequences of possible spillover effects that can arise from international law’s distribution of sovereign power to multiple states.
States have legal authority to govern within the limits of their
territory, but in some cases the results of their policy choices may
spill over their territorial limits, such as policies related to carbon
emissions or the development of a dangerous nuclear facility near
the border of a neighboring state.166 The major normative premise
160. See CRIDDLE & FOX-DECENT, supra note 16, at 244-45.
161. See id. at 171.
162. Eyal Benvenisti, Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: On the Accountability of States
to Foreign Stakeholders, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 295, 314 (2013). In the case of outsiders seeking
to enter a receiving state, Benvenisti claims that the receiving state is under an “obligation
not to deny entry to migrants and refugees without taking into account the asylum seekers’
individual concerns and without at least providing justification for their exclusion.” Id. at 311.
163. See Georges A. J. Scelle, Le Phénomène Juridique du Dédoublement Fonctionnel, in
RECHTFRAGEN DER INTERNATIONALEN ORGANISATION: FESTSCHRIFT FÜR HANS WEHBERG ZU
SEINEM 70. GEBURTSTAG 324, 324 (Walter Schätzel & Hans Jürgen Schlochauer eds., 1956).
164. Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, Mandatory Multilateralism, 113 AM. J. INT’L L.
272, 298-300 (2019).
165. Id.
166. See Mattias Kumm, Constitutionalism and the Cosmopolitan State 18 (N.Y.U. Pub.
L. & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 13-68, 2013) [hereinafter Constitutionalism and the
Cosmopolitan State], https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2338547 [https://
perma.cc/867G-V4KJ]; Mattias Kumm, The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: An
Integrated Conception of Public Law, 20 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 605, 613 (2013); Mattias
Kumm, The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the Relationship Between
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of the argument for joint stewardship is that states are not entitled
to unilaterally set policies that have wrongful spillover effects, that
is, harms prejudicial to the rights or justice claims of foreign
nationals.167 As Mattias Kumm puts it, international law must
settle these matters because “any claim by one state to be able to
resolve these issues authoritatively and unilaterally amounts to a
form of domination.”168 “In cases that affect humanity generally,
such as the regulation of carbon emissions, the ‘people’ subject to
the local state’s sovereign power is humanity at large.”169 Therefore,
“the class of beneficiaries in this iteration of the state-subject
fiduciary relationship” is not limited to the state’s national legal
subjects, but “is humanity itself.”170
Borders present a structural spillover effect, one that results from
international law’s organization of the world into multiple territorially sovereign states.171
At the limit, in a case where the refugee was forcibly removed
from her home state and denied a right of asylum by all others,
the territorial jurisdiction exercised over the earth’s surface
[enjoyed] by sovereign states would convert her very physical
existence into an illegality.172

The refugee’s “body occupies space and must exist somewhere, but
... (on the present assumption) [the exiled outsider] has no right to
be anywhere.”173 The asylum seeker’s unavoidable presence
anywhere would constitute a permanent trespass.174 Benvenisti
compellingly argues that “the dramatic consequences of states

Constitutionalism in and Beyond the State, in RULING THE WORLD? 258, 299 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff
& Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009).
167. See Constitutionalism and the Cosmopolitan State, supra note 166, at 9, 18.
168. Id. at 9.
169. See CRIDDLE & FOX-DECENT, supra note 16, at 267.
170. See id.
171. Constitutionalism and the Cosmopolitan State, supra note 166, at 15-17.
172. See CRIDDLE & FOX-DECENT, supra note 16, at 267.
173. See id.
174. See ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM 279-80 (2009) (arguing that if all land
were privately held and the landless were denied permission to be anywhere, “they would do
wrong simply by being wherever they happened to be”).
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universally acting to exclude entry” must be addressed “with certain
limitations on the sovereign’s right to exclude.”175
“The ‘dramatic consequences’ to which Benvenisti refers are
structural spillover effects arising from international law’s distribution of territorial sovereignty to states.”176 Under the dual commissions model,
that distribution can be legitimate only if [international law’s]
authorization of territorial sovereignty ... can be understood to
be made on behalf of every person subject to it, ... which is to
say, on behalf of humanity. For this to be possible, international
law must legally guarantee that every individual, come what
may, has a fair opportunity to pursue [a decent life] somewhere;177

that is, a life free from human rights abuse.
Ordinarily, this opportunity is provided ... through the state’s
grant of citizenship to individuals either born within its territory
(jus soli) or born to citizens of the state (jus sanguinis).... But if
an individual is forced to flee or is stripped of citizenship and
deported from her home state, international law must step in to
provide the refugee somewhere she can live a decent life.
Without the availability of surrogate protection, international
law could not be said to guarantee to every individual ... a fair
opportunity to live [a decent life] somewhere. International law
would lose its claim to [legitimate] authority with respect to
territory ... because it could not be said to authorize territorial
sovereignty on behalf of every person subject to it; refugees and
the stateless would be excluded.178

It is important to appreciate from the outset that the possible
exclusion of refugees and the stateless from international law’s
protection points to a conceptual claim going to the very legality of
the international legal order, considered as a legal system, as well
as to a normative claim about the wickedness of such a regime. We
175.
176.
177.
178.

Benvenisti, supra note 162, at 311.
CRIDDLE & FOX-DECENT, supra note 16, at 267.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Id. at 267-68.
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have argued elsewhere that a fiduciary model of international law
makes available a representational fiduciary criterion that can
serve as a standard of adequacy for assessing the legitimacy of a
state’s action.179 This criterion stipulates that for a state’s action to
be legitimate with respect to a given individual, it must be intelligible as action made on behalf of or in the name of the individual
subject to it, even if the state’s action sets back the individual’s
interests.180 We refer to this norm as the “fiduciary criterion of
legitimacy,” or simply the “fiduciary criterion.”
The fiduciary criterion is both normative and conceptual, and
helps explain and justify the claim that, according to Joseph Raz, all
legal systems necessarily make: the claim to possess legitimate
authority.181 In Raz’s view, it is an existence condition of a legal
system that it claims to possess legitimate authority.182 It follows
that legal systems either have (and claim) legitimate authority or
they possess merely de facto authority—the moral standing to
exercise legal power relative to their subjects—or they possess mere
coercive power over their subjects while claiming but not having the
legitimate authority necessary to ground a general (though defeasible) duty to obey the law.183 It follows from Raz’s conceptual
claim that a merely coercive or de facto authority that makes no
claim to legitimate authority cannot ground a legal system. A
179. Id. at 3.
180. Id. at 3, 99-100, 131, 217, 240, 268, 288.
181. JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 199 (1994) (“[E]very legal system claims
that it possesses legitimate authority.”). Raz uses phrases such as “the law claims” or “legal
systems claim” to indicate that legal officials or institutions implicitly or explicitly make
certain claims as legal authorities. See id. One of us argues elsewhere that for Raz’s
conceptual claim to be able to explain law’s authority, as Raz intends, then it must be
understood as a standard of adequacy of legality and not merely as something the law simply
wishes or asserts to be true. See Evan Fox-Decent, Jurisprudential Reflections on
Cosmopolitan Law, in THE DOUBLE-FACING CONSTITUTION 121, 137 (Jacco Bomhoff et al. eds.,
2020).
182. RAZ, supra note 181, at 199. Following Raz, we use “legitimate authority” and
“authority” interchangeably, and distinguish both from non-legitimate authority with “merely
de facto authority.” By “legitimacy” we mean the standing enjoyed by a bona fide authority
that entitles it to exercise effective legal power so as to announce and enforce law that its
subjects have a defeasible duty to obey. Put slightly differently, an authority is legitimate if
and only if it possesses effective legal power that it is entitled to exercise (or, has standing to
exercise) in relation to its subjects so as to put them under a defeasible duty to obey its
directives, rules, commands, and so on.
183. See id.
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corollary of the conceptual claim, Raz says, is that law “must be
capable of possessing authority.”184 In other words, for a putative
authority to be able to claim to possess legitimate authority, it must
be possible for it to do so. Raz readily admits that the laws of the
physical universe are incapable of claiming or possessing
authority.185 Arguably, however, the implications of the corollary
Raz draws from his conceptual claim go further than the laws of
physics.
As Kristen Rundle remarks, “it is difficult to see how the
precondition of the capacity for legitimate authority over a subject
that Raz suggests is part of the nature of law, and something which
it cannot fundamentally fail to possess, could be satisfied if the law
designated that subject as a slave.”186 A Razian skeptic might reply
that legal officials from Rome and the Antebellum South asserted
the legitimacy of their slave-holding regimes while holding de facto
power, and thus, pace Rundle, their regimes are properly considered
legal regimes, even though they were clearly wicked regimes. And
because slavery was always a historically contingent institution, it
was always possible for the relevant slave-holding regime to be
other than what it was and actually legitimate. It may seem that
the demand implicit to Raz’s corollary is satisfied and that Rundle’s
view is refuted.
It is important to appreciate, however, that from the standpoint
of a conception of legality premised on legitimate authority, slaveowning regimes are problematic precisely because slaves are
stripped of legal personality and treated as things rather than
persons.187 It is no more conceptually possible for a slave to stand as
a subject within an authority relation than it is for a rock or a
chattel to so stand. Furthermore, the contingency of slavery is
irrelevant, because the only way a slave-holding society becomes
capable of possessing legitimate authority relative to slaves is by
ceasing to be a slave-holding society. So long as the society maintains slavery, it rejects the possibility of having legitimate authority
184. Id.
185. Id. at 200-01.
186. Kristen Rundle, Form and Agency in Raz’s Legal Positivism, 32 LAW & PHIL. 767, 787
(2013).
187. For fuller elaboration of the argument set out here and immediately below, see FoxDecent, supra note 181, at 132-38.
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vis-à-vis the individuals held in slavery. We shall see that these
insights about the relationship between law and authority have
important implications for the dual commissions theory’s explanation of both the customary nature of the duty of non-refoulement and
its peremptory status.
Under this theory, states at the global level are conceptualized as
joint fiduciaries or stewards of humanity, and international law
entrusts them as such to govern collectively the earth’s territory on
behalf of humanity.188 A power-conferring “fiduciary principle
authorizes joint stewardship of the earth’s surface, but requires as
a condition of its authorization that states participate in a collective
[and multilateral] regime of surrogate protection in the service of
exiled outsiders.”189 Significantly, IRL conceives of itself as a regime
of surrogate protection,190 and so the dual commissions theory
supplies an account of refugee law’s self-understanding. “International law supplies the legal framework for a regime of surrogate
protection by carving out an exception to territorial sovereignty in
favor of refugees.”191 The dual commissions model “explains the
refugee’s standing to make a claim on this exception by positing
states as joint fiduciaries of the earth’s surface on behalf of humanity, and in particular on behalf of asylum seekers entitled to resort
to surrogate protection.”192 In other words, the dual commissions
model conceptualizes “sovereignty in a manner that makes its
territorial dimension consistent with the ... entitlement of every
member of humanity to have his or her [bare] physical existence
[somewhere] not treated as a wrong.”193 The duty of non-refoulement
can thus be understood and explained as a consequence of international law’s claim to legitimate authority. Without this duty in
place, international law would treat the bare physical existence of
exiled outsiders as a wrong and so could not possibly claim to

188. See Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 152, at 91.
189. See CRIDDLE & FOX-DECENT, supra note 16, at 268.
190. See, e.g., Canada (Att’y Gen.) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 709 (Can.) (referring to the
international refugee regime as one of “surrogate or substitute protection” (citing JAMES
HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 135 (1991))).
191. CRIDDLE & FOX-DECENT, supra note 16, at 268.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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authorize territorial sovereignty in their names or on their behalf.194
That is, international law, in this respect, could not possibly claim
to possess legitimate authority with respect to refugees. International law would thereby fail to meet the demands of the fiduciary
criterion of legitimacy and so would fail to be authoritative with
respect to exiled outsiders.195 To the extent that all legal systems
must, as a conceptual matter, claim to possess authority over their
subjects to be legal systems, the very legality of international law
vis-à-vis refugees would be in doubt. The conceptual requirements
of legality thus pose limits on the substantive content of international law such that IRL’s content must be consistent with the
possibility of international law possessing legitimate authority visà-vis refugees.196
Notice some of the implications of this reasoning. If states must
claim to possess legitimate authority over the individuals amenable
to their jurisdiction in order to govern them through law, then it
follows that the myriad national and international policies, laws,
and treaty provisions that embody or support a duty of nonrefoulement must be deemed to be actions undertaken, at least in
part, because they are necessary to the states’ claim to authority
and the rule of law. This implication of the fiduciary criterion
strengthens the view that non-refoulement is a customary norm of
international law, because rule-of-law-championing states can have
attributed to them a legal motivation for actions that abide by or
commend a duty of non-refoulement. It also follows from the
argument above that actions that breach the duty of non-refoulement are not relevant to an inquiry into whether state practice
reflects a customary norm of non-refoulement, for only valid state
action can count as state practice in this context. Invalid or ultra
vires actions are attributable to states for purposes of determining
liability, but they are ordinarily irrelevant to the issue of international customary lawmaking, because such actions have no legal

194. See id. at 267.
195. See id. at 268.
196. For further elaboration of this relationship between the conceptual and substantive
domains, see Fox-Decent, supra note 181.
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effects of themselves other than the possible generation of
liability.197
The fiduciary criterion also supports viewing the duty of nonrefoulement as a peremptory norm. We have argued elsewhere that
the fiduciary criterion can help inform inquiry into whether an
international norm is peremptory.198 International norms such as
the prohibitions against slavery, genocide, and torture, for example,
may be understood to be jus cogens because it could never be the
case that they could be intelligible as norms enacted in the name of
or on behalf of the individuals victimized by them.199 Such actions
constitute irredeemable abuse or domination, and so neither
limitation nor derogation from them is permitted as a matter of
international law.200 The same may be said of refoulement to face
persecution. It could never be the case that a policy of subjecting an
individual to a deliberate and avoidable risk of persecution could be
made in the name of or on behalf of that individual. Such a policy
bears indelible stains of needless abuse and domination. And, as we
will discuss in Part III when we turn to the closed-border policies
states have adopted to arrest the spread of COVID-19, the case for
peremptory non-refoulement is especially powerful given the many
alternative means available to achieve the desired outcome. We set
out first, however, a further argument in favor of viewing IRL from
the perspective of the dual commissions framework.
We have argued elsewhere that public fiduciaries generally have
dual first-order and second-order commissions, which typically are
to their immediate beneficiaries (first-order) and to the wider legal
regime within which they hold and exercise fiduciary power (secondorder).201 For example, lawyers owe first-order duties of zealous advocacy to their clients and second-order duties of candor and good
197. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 108-09, ¶¶ 206-08 (June 27) (explaining that state acts in violation
of customary rules do not undermine the rules when the states concerned do not contest the
validity of the rules themselves).
198. CRIDDLE & FOX-DECENT, supra note 16, at 77-122; Evan J. Criddle & Evan FoxDecent, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 331 (2009); Evan Fox-Decent
& Evan J. Criddle, The Fiduciary Constitution of Human Rights, 15 LEGAL THEORY 301
(2009).
199. See CRIDDLE & FOX-DECENT, supra note 16, at 77-78.
200. See id. at 77.
201. Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 152, at 70.
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faith—as “guardians of the law”202 or “officer[s] of the court”203—to
the legal system.204 The second-order duties aim at a wider public
benefit.205 In the event of an irreconcilable conflict between firstorder and second-order duties, the second-order norms prevail.206 We
argue that the reason for the priority of second-order norms is that
they provide the framework that make first-order norms justifiable.207 As Robert Gordon puts it, second-order principles
applicable to lawyers must prevail in the event of conflict with firstorder duties because a “system of adversary representation can only
work, can only be justified, if it’s carried on within a framework of
law and regulation that assures approximately just outcomes, at
least in the aggregate.”208
The same logic applies to states’ local commission to govern and
represent their people vis-à-vis their global commission to provide
a system of surrogate protection for refugees. States’ local commission presupposes that the citizens of a state are entitled to enter and
remain within its borders. Were states entitled to banish or forcibly
exile citizens, then the states’ rule over their citizens would
constitute a severe form of domination and put their claim to
legitimate authority (and thus to legality) in doubt. Moreover, as a
matter of international law, states’ local commission includes a
general right to exclude outsiders and determine the criteria for
citizenship.209 But as Benvenisti and others have noted, the possibility that states could close their borders universally means that
they could, in principle, deny exiled outsiders the possibility of
existing lawfully anywhere.210
Refugees without a peremptory right to non-refoulement would,
in effect, be stripped of their legal personality and treated as

202. MODEL CODE OF PRO. RESP. pmbl. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980).
203. See, e.g., Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers as Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39, 43
n.20 (1989) (quoting Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957)).
204. See Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 152, at 69.
205. See id. at 72-76.
206. Id. at 76.
207. Id.
208. Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 17 (1988).
209. See CRIDDLE & FOX-DECENT, supra note 16, at 342-43.
210. See Benvenisti, supra note 162, at 311.
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nonpersons with no access to lawful safe harbor, much less citizenship.211 Their status would approximate enemy combatants
detained in the war on terror and denied prisoner-of-war status so
as to deny them the benefit of legal protection and the rule of law.
Exiled outsiders would find themselves in a state of nature with no
exit, for there would be nowhere they could go to live lawfully with
others.212 Under the dual commissions theory, states have a global
commission to act multilaterally to establish a universal system of
surrogate protection that enjoys priority over states’ local commission to exclude outsiders.213 A cornerstone of this system is the duty
of non-refoulement, which guarantees legally that refugees have the
right to exist somewhere lawfully.214 As a second-order commission,
IRL’s system of surrogate protection avoids entrapping exiles in a
state of nature, while at the same time making states’ first-order
and limited right to exclude justifiable.215
A possible objection to our theory might suggest that legal norms
protective of national security and public health, such as those that
fall within the meaning of Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention,
are also second-order norms.216 If states were required to admit
severe national security and health threats, such as migrants who
have contracted COVID-19, one might think that the very rationale
for states’ first-order commission (that is, the secure and collective
self-determination of a political community) would disintegrate. As
we will see in Part III, however, this objection rests on a false
dichotomy because in practice receiving states can attend to their
security and health concerns while declining to return asylum
seekers to persecution.

211. See Fox-Decent, supra note 181, at 143.
212. See id.
213. See Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 152, at 93-94.
214. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
215. In this sense, the fiduciary and dual commissions theory’s account of IRL as a
necessary feature of a legitimate international legal order resonates with David Owen’s
characterization of refugee protection as a “legitimacy repair mechanism” for the international
political order. See DAVID OWEN, WHAT DO WE OWE REFUGEES? 47 (2020). We leave to another
day the scope of the limited right to exclude, but for argument that on a dual commissions and
fiduciary view it is far narrower than international law presently allows, see Fox-Decent,
supra note 181, at 124-26.
216. We thank Colin Grey for raising this objection.
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C. The Skeptics Reconsidered
We consider now how understanding the duty of non-refoulement
in light of the dual commissions theory provides resources to
respond to the skeptical concerns considered above.
Recall David Miller’s claims that states are entitled to determine
for themselves when they have taken in enough refugees so as to
help cope with the refugee crisis and that this means facing up to
the possibility that some bona fide refugees may find themselves
with nowhere they can lawfully go.217 Miller is clearly uncomfortable
with this prospect but believes it is unavoidable given the significance of states maintaining control over their public culture and
population size.218 On the dual commissions view, Miller has
dramatically underestimated the legal and normative cost of
sending individuals back to face a serious risk of persecution. As a
joint steward of the earth’s habitable territory, under the dual
commissions theory the receiving state has an ineliminable duty of
non-refoulement.219 The asylum seeker must have somewhere she
can exist lawfully and free from persecution for states of our
multistate world order to be able to claim to possess legitimate
authority—and therefore to govern through legality—vis-à-vis
asylum seekers. For a state to adopt Miller’s policy and return
refugees to danger would imply that the state is renouncing its
claim to govern through the rule of law, because the state would
deport such individuals through the use of force alone, in defiance
of the duty it owes to asylum seekers as a territorially vested joint
steward of humanity.
Recall that Wellman thinks a position much like Miller’s is
defensible on grounds of freedom of association and self-determination.220 His brasher formulations, as noted, affirm without qualification that receiving states are entitled to turn away bona fide
refugees, on the grounds that states’ freedom of association is a
vitally important interest and because humanitarian duties to
refugees may be satisfied by intervention in the affairs of the
217.
218.
219.
220.

See supra text accompanying notes 110-12.
Miller, supra note 96, at 369-72.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra text accompanying note 118.

1112

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:1067

sending state.221 Ultimately, however, he concedes in a footnote that
receiving states are not entitled to deport refugees until such time
as the danger in the home state has passed.222 His position is
consistent with “warehousing” refugees in camps near their home
state, so long as the camps themselves are not sites of danger.223 The
dual commissions theory, by contrast, affirms that states, as joint
stewards of humanity, are duty bound to provide exiles safe and
lawful harbor, and thus explains the legal duty of non-refoulement
within this framework. The dual commissions theory also explains
the common practice among receiving northern states to provide
asylum seekers a fair opportunity at a decent life. As noted above,
if they did not provide this opportunity for refuge, the legal systems
of the world’s states could not claim to possess legitimate authority
vis-à-vis refugees because refugees could be excluded from lawful
residency and possible membership in all of them.224 It is important
to emphasize that the mere possibility of universal exclusion is
enough to put in doubt the legal authority of the world’s states vis-àvis refugees, since the possibility alone, independently of whether
it is realized, constitutes a severe threat of arbitrary treatment and
thus a form of domination.
Wellman and Miller might reply that although warehousing is
regrettable, asylum seekers sent to camps are at least physically
safe and not stripped of their legal personality. Warehousing, on
this view, is consistent with the duty of non-refoulement because
that duty requires merely that refugees not be returned to a place
of danger.225 Yet warehousing of any kind involves indeterminate
and forcible confinement to a camp and usually the suffering of
deplorable conditions.226 In our view, subjection to indeterminate
221. See supra text accompanying notes 120-21.
222. See supra text accompanying note 124.
223. See Merrill Smith, Warehousing Refugees: A Denial of Rights, a Waste of Humanity,
WORLD REFUGEE SURV. 38 (2004), https://sswm.info/sites/default/files/reference_attachments/
SMITH%202004%20Warehousing%20Refugees.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZD5J-MSFF] (“Warehousing is the practice of keeping refugees in protracted situations of restricted mobility,
enforced idleness, and dependency.”).
224. See supra text accompanying notes 209-10.
225. See Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 33(1).
226. Studies documenting the inhumane conditions in refugee camps include MEDECINS
SANS FRONTIERES, DADAAB REFUGEES: AN UNCERTAIN TOMORROW (2014), https://reliefweb.
int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/bp-dadaab-march-2014-low.pdf [https://perma.cc/CZZ3-

2021]

THE AUTHORITY OF INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW

1113

forcible confinement is an infringement of a person’s human rights
to liberty, freedom of association, and freedom of movement. It also
imperils numerous socioeconomic and cultural human rights,
including labor rights, rights to an adequate standard of living,
rights to health, and rights to education.227 Moreover, a state that
delivers refugees for warehousing abroad may violate IRL. From the
perspective of IRL, it is not sufficient for refugee camps to guarantee
refugees’ physical security because the prohibition of refoulement
forbids returning someone to a place where her “life or freedom”
would be threatened on account of a protected ground.228 A compromise of freedom on Convention grounds, such as the refugee’s
nationality, is enough.
Another objection related to warehousing that Wellman and
Miller might raise concerns burden sharing and the proper target
of liability for breaching the duty of non-refoulement in the event of
a mass influx. On the fiduciary model, the state receiving an influx
cannot return refugees to persecution, but, we have argued elsewhere, the state can seek the assistance of the international
community, and the international community has a duty to assist.229
In these circumstances, the international community and the
receiving state are jointly and severally liable to refugees comprising a mass influx. The liability of the international community
arises from its construction of an international legal order that
cedes to states monopolies on territorial jurisdiction and the use of
coercive force.230 The community, in other words, is co-responsible
with member states for addressing refugee crises, particularly if a
given state faces the threat of a breakdown of public order arising
from a mass influx. The receiving state and incoming refugees alike
suffer an injustice if the international community turns its back on
them. However, the receiving state remains severally liable to bona
XE38]; ALISON LEDWITH, ZAATARI: THE INSTANT CITY 10-12 (2014), http://sigus.scripts.mit.edu/
x/files/Zaatari/AHIPublication.pdf [https://perma.cc/C8VU-ACHZ]; and Thailand: Refugee
Policies Ad Hoc and Inadequate, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept. 13, 2012, 3:37 PM), https://www.
hrw.org/news/2012/09/13/thailand-refugee-policies-ad-hoc-and-inadequate [https://perma.cc/
V9KU-3GNX].
227. See, e.g., MEDICINS SANS FRONTIERES, supra note 226; LEDWITH, supra note 226, at 1012.
228. See Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 33(1) (emphasis added).
229. CRIDDLE & FOX-DECENT, supra note 16, at 276-82.
230. See id. at 29-30.
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fide refugees and is not entitled to return them to persecution. The
state would be in a position akin to a divorced parent who must
shoulder alone the burden of childcare because the other parent has
absconded and forsaken their responsibilities.
We do not discuss further the problematic policy of warehousing
because our principal practical target is policies states have adopted
to turn away asylum seekers during the time of COVID-19, as will
be discussed in Part III. Typically, these policies are implemented
without consideration of warehousing and often with the result that
the refugee is deported to a place where they have a well-founded
fear of persecution.231 There is a good sense in which these policies
presuppose the kind of default rule of state autonomy that Lotus is
usually taken to represent.
Lotus and its progeny could be understood to supply two arguments from international law against a peremptory norm of nonrefoulement. We will call them the minimalist and voluntarist
arguments. The minimalist argument is the idea that states have
only those obligations that are clearly expressed in either treaty or
customary law. We have argued that a customary and peremptory
norm of non-refoulement is immanent to, and thus partially constitutive of, the legitimate authority that a multistate and territorially exhaustive international legal order can claim vis-à-vis exiled
outsiders.232 In Lotus, Judge Weiss explained that “the rule
sanctioning the [equal] sovereignty of States” is one “which does not
even require to be embodied in a treaty,” because without this rule
“no international law would be possible, since the purpose of
[international] law precisely is to harmonize and reconcile the
different sovereignties over which it exercises its sway.”233 Mutatis
mutandis, the same may be said of the peremptory principle of nonrefoulement, which follows as a direct consequence of (1) the division
of the earth’s surface into territorially exhaustive and sovereign
states, and (2) the idea that dual-commission states exist to serve
their people and humanity at large, such that every individual is
entitled to exist somewhere on the earth without his or her mere
231. See infra Part III.
232. Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 152, at 268-69.
233. S.S. “Lotus” (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 40, 44 (Sept. 7)
(dissenting opinion by M. Weiss) (emphasis omitted).
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existence being a trespass.234 The duty to refrain from refoulement
is part of what it means for states to be fiduciaries of humanity.235
Thus, the principle of non-refoulement, like the principle of sovereign equality, is integral to the constitution of international law as
a legal order.
The voluntarist argument against a peremptory duty of nonrefoulement is that states are bound by only the obligations they
voluntarily accept and that exceptions to non-refoulement within the
positive law (for example, Articles 1(F) and 33(2) of the Refugee
Convention) suggest that states have never agreed to be bound by
a general and peremptory duty of non-refoulement. On this view,
customary law is to be construed narrowly with the result that
states have a duty of non-refoulement no wider than treaties such as
the Refugee Convention and Torture Convention expressly allow.
We have argued elsewhere that foundational principles of sovereign
equality and joint stewardship are baked into the mold of international legal order, and that these principles are particularly visible
across a wide range of contexts in which international law requires
states to engage in multilateral policy formation and decisionmaking.236 Voluntarism is hard-pressed to explain international
law’s contemporary practice of mandatory multilateralism. At base,
it is a positivist theory that reached its zenith in the nineteenth
century, and that is at odds with jus cogens norms generally
because these bind independently of state consent and over state
objections.237
Schmitt’s theory of executive supremacy, however, goes well
beyond voluntarism in its skepticism of customary law. Recall that
under Schmitt’s theory, the sovereign has legally unlimited
authority to suspend public law.238 Accordingly, the Schmittian
sovereign has authority to suspend the operation of public international law whenever he or she deems it necessary or prudent to do
so, including the duty of non-refoulement. Contemporary advocates
234. Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 152, at 267-69.
235. See id.
236. Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 164.
237. See ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 77, at 114 (disputing the consent-driven custom
theory and concluding that “[c]alling peremptory norms customary distorts the concept of
custom beyond recognition”).
238. See supra Part II.A.4.
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of a Schmittian conception of sovereignty might take encouragement from the decision-making power that international law vests
in the sovereign to decide on apparent exceptions to the duty of nonrefoulement, such as those found under Article 33(2) of the Refugee
Convention related to war crimes or serious criminality or “a danger
to the security of the [host] country.”239 On a Schmittian construal,
the executive’s legally unlimited discretion could take one of two
general forms. On the first, the sovereign acts facially within the
given parameters of the IRL exceptions to non-refoulement, but in
substance declares without individual assessment that all members
of a certain group are a danger and then refuses some or all of them
entry en masse.240 The second form is the declaration of an emergency and subsequent suspension of IRL and other areas of national
and international public law, leaving the executive with legally
unlimited extralegal powers until such time as the sovereign decides
to reinstitute public law.241
Both the facially intralegal and explicitly extralegal forms of
Schmittian executive power are far outside various requirements of
IRL and its ordinary practice. As noted in Part I, although Article
33(2) provides some apparent scope within the Refugee Convention
to limit application of the non-refoulement principle, that scope is
cabined by the Torture Convention, which provides that individuals
are not to be returned to a place where they face a serious risk of
torture.242 Moreover, various international courts have held that
IHRL prohibits returning individuals to face torture or CIDT,
suggesting that the prohibition is of a jus cogens character.243
Additionally, to the extent that the duty of non-refoulement is a
customary obligation, the conventional exceptions found in the
Refugee Convention arguably do not apply.
In practice, receiving countries in the North ordinarily use
individualized risk assessment and status determination, as
239. Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 33(2).
240. Cf. Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 152, at 144.
241. For defense of an “Extra-Legal Measures model” of emergency powers, see Oren Gross,
Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J.
1011, 1023 (2003). For a persuasive reply, see DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW
51-52 (2006).
242. Torture Convention, supra note 9, art. 3.
243. See, e.g., Chahal v. United Kingdom (No. 22), 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1831, 1861-62.
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prescribed by the Refugee Convention and Protocol.244 Fair individual determinations allow receiving states to ensure that individuals
who claim they face a serious risk of persecution actually do face a
serious risk, while giving claimants the opportunity to enter and
remain in a foreign state lawfully while avoiding persecution in
their home state. Furthermore, initial determinations in northern
countries are typically subject to independent judicial review, which
further entrenches and underscores the legal nature of refugee
status determination.245 In short, individualized determinations in
the shadow of judicial review are consistent with states’ joint
stewardship of the earth’s territory and a refugee regime of
surrogate protection. On the other hand, blanket bans on groups
alleged to pose a danger are radically inconsistent with IRL’s means
and goals. Border closings to whole classes of asylum seekers reveal
starkly that Schmittian assertions of executive power in this context
have as their aim the rejection of IRL rather than its interpretation.
Having said this, we need to concede that, as a matter of orthodox
interpretation, the prohibition on refoulement is arguably emerging
as a peremptory norm, but plainly its status as jus cogens is not as
entrenched as, for example, the prohibitions on genocide, slavery,
torture, and military aggression. Whereas the Refugee Convention
contemplates exceptions, the positive law on the preceding list of
peremptory norms emphatically denies their susceptibility to
limitation or derogation.246 In our view, an advantage of the dual
commissions theory is that it provides a cogent argument for recognizing the peremptory status of the duty of non-refoulement, while
ultimately mooring that argument in the same representational
244. See, e.g., Obtaining Asylum in the United States, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS.,
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-and-asylum/asylum/obtaining-asylum-in-theunited-states [https://perma.cc/XPN7-XQA7] (detailing the individual assessment protocol for
refugees seeking asylum in the United States).
245. See, e.g., id. (explaining how U.S. immigration judges review rejected asylum
applications).
246. See, e.g., Torture Convention, supra note 9, art. 2(2) (“No exceptional circumstances
whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any
other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.”); Reservations to
Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951
I.C.J. 15, 23-24 (May 28) (arguing that reservations to the 1948 Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide would be contrary to its “special characteristics”);
ICCPR, supra note 85, arts. 4(2), 8(1) (asserting the prohibition against slavery and that no
derogation from such prohibition may be permitted).
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fiduciary criterion available to assess the jus cogens character of
other norms. In other words, the criterion that inquires whether a
limitation of, or derogation from, a candidate peremptory norm
could ever be intelligible as a limitation or derogation made in the
name or on behalf of the people subject to it.
We turn now to test this theory of the peremptory status of nonrefoulement through a critical appraisal of numerous states’ refusal
to accept asylum seekers on the grounds that COVID-19 presents
unmitigable danger.
III. LESSONS FROM THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC
With twenty-six million refugees currently living in forced exile
outside their countries of origin, the global refugee crisis has
reached staggering proportions.247 Since COVID-19 exploded on the
international scene in early 2020, the plight of refugees around the
world has become increasingly dire—not only because many face
greater vulnerability to the disease but also because the pathways
to international protection have narrowed considerably.248 In March
2020, UNHCR and International Organization for Migration (IOM)
announced a temporary suspension of the international refugee
resettlement program.249 Many states have also closed their borders
247. See Figures at a Glance, U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES (June 18, 2020), https://
www.unhcr.org/en-us/figures-at-a-glance.html [https://perma.cc/Y3DX-6MX2]. Another 45.7
million people are internally displaced within the borders of their own country. Id.
248. See U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, UNHCR PROJECTED GLOBAL RESETTLEMENT
NEEDS 2020 (2019), https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/resettlement/5d1384047/projectedglobal-resettlement-needs-2020.html [https://perma.cc/S74Y-J3ZQ] (discussing expanding
needs for refugee protection in many regions of the world); see also Court of Justice of the
European Union Press Release No. 79/20, Advocate General’s Opinion in Case C-808/18
Commission v Hungary (June 25, 2020), https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/
pdf/2020-06/cp200079en.pdf [https://perma.cc/9T98-GQNP] (concluding that Hungary’s policy
of limiting immigration to certain “transit zones” violates E.U. law); Migrant Protection
Protocols, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2019/01/
24/migrant-protection-protocols [https://perma.cc/U56K-6Y7D] (explaining how the United
States has compelled asylum seekers to wait outside the United States while their
applications are pending); The State of Refugee Resettlement in 2020, INT’L RESCUE COMM.
(Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.rescue.org/announcement/state-refugee-resettlement-2020
[https://perma.cc/SL2N-4UME] (explaining that the United States’ eighteen thousand person
cap for refugee resettlement marked a “drastic reduction” from previous years, which had
averaged over ninety-five thousand since 1980).
249. IOM, UNHCR Announce Temporary Suspension of Resettlement Travel for Refugees,
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to asylum seekers.250 One has even expelled asylum seekers who
were already inside its borders when COVID-19 arrived.251 As a
consequence of these developments, the non-refoulement principle
now faces its greatest test since the Refugee Convention entered
force seventy years ago.
To be sure, not all measures adopted in response to COVID-19
violate international law. The non-refoulement principle does not
obligate states to grant visas or authorize international air travel in
order to facilitate refugee mobility.252 At a minimum, however, the
non-refoulement principle does prohibit states from turning back
refugees who reach their territory to places where they would face
a well-founded fear of persecution on account of a protected
ground.253 This includes a prohibition on “indirect” or “chain”
refoulement—forced transfer to a third-country where a refugee
would face a serious risk of refoulement.254 Considerable authority
also supports the view that states may not prevent refugees from
accessing their shores by intercepting and repatriating foreign
vessels at sea.255 To the extent that emergency measures violate
U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/press/
2020/3/5e7103034/iom-unhcr-announce-temporary-suspension-resettlement-travel-refugees.
html [https://perma.cc/SVV9-FFJ6].
250. See Andrea Salcedo, Sanam Yar & Gina Cherelus, Coronavirus Travel Restrictions,
Across the Globe, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/article/coronavirustravel-restrictions.html [https://perma.cc/28G7-5GG6] (describing border closures by country).
251. See Yael Schacher & Chris Beyrer, Expelling Asylum Seekers Is Not the Answer: U.S.
Border Policy in the Time of COVID-19, REFUGEES INT’L (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.refugees
international.org/reports/2020/4/26/expelling-asylum-seekers-is-not-the-answer-us-borderpolicy-in-the-time-of-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/GNT8-SNQP] (discussing U.S. expulsions).
252. Many states have suspended international flights or restricted visas in response to
COVID-19. See Salcedo et al., supra note 250.
253. See ExCom Conclusions, supra note 24, No. 85 (XLIX) ¶ (q) (affirming the principle
of “no rejection at frontiers without access to fair and effective procedures for determining
[refugee] status and protection needs”).
254. See Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 33(1) (prohibiting refoulement “in any
manner whatsoever”); Ilias & Ahmed v. Hungary, App. No. 47287/15, ¶ 133 (Nov. 21, 2019),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{“itemid”:[“001-198760"]} [https://perma.cc/B62G-F2J3]
(explaining that states have a duty under the ECHR “to make sure that the intermediary
country’s asylum procedure affords sufficient guarantees to avoid an asylum-seeker being
removed, directly or indirectly, to his country of origin without a proper evaluation of the risks
he faces”); James Crawford & Patricia Hyndman, Three Heresies in the Application of the
Refugee Convention, 1 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 155, 171 (1989) (observing that Refugee Convention
Article 33(1) “prohibits indirect as well as direct measures of return, otherwise the words 'in
any manner whatsoever' would be unnecessary”).
255. See Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 97, 155-56 (holding that naval
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these well-established norms of international law, they pose a
threat to the rule of international law.
Guided by these considerations, this Part reviews and critiques
border-control measures adopted respectively by the United States,
Canada, Cyprus, Italy, Malta, and Malaysia in response to COVID19. We explain briefly why international organizations and human
rights monitors have condemned these measures as violating
international law. Remarkably, the states concerned have not made
serious efforts to defend their suspension of refugee protections
under international law. In effect, they have all but conceded that
the measures violate their commitments under applicable treaties
and customary international law. Instead, they have defended their
actions based on arguments about compelling state necessity (raison
d’etat): the need to protect their people from deadly viral infection.
Accordingly, these emergency measures may best be understood not
merely as discrete acts of noncompliance with international law but
instead as more fundamental challenges to the peremptory character of the non-refoulement principle itself. Drawing on the arguments developed in Part II, we explain why the international
community should vigorously resist these challenges, reaffirming
the peremptory character of the non-refoulement norm and the
importance of the international legal order’s claim to legitimate
authority.256

operations to push back migrants on the Mediterranean violate the prohibition against
collective expulsions in Article 4 of ECHR Protocol 4); Advisory Opinion, supra note 27, ¶ 24
(“[T]he purpose, intent and meaning of Article 33(1) of the 1951 Convention are unambiguous
and establish an obligation not to return a refugee or asylum-seeker to a country where he
or she would be [at] risk of persecution or other serious harm, which applies wherever a State
exercises jurisdiction, including at the frontier, on the high seas or on the territory of another
State.”).
256. Of course, it is possible that in some cases the arguments offered to defend closedborder policies may be made in bad faith so as to occlude, for example, xenophobic
motivations. We proceed on the assumption that not all arguments are of this kind.
Arguments that challenge our view, such as those discussed in Part II, for example, are fully
intelligible as good-faith positions that are understood by their defenders to stand or fall on
the strength of the reasons that support them. The domain of public reason may be subject
to perversion and corruption, but it is not necessarily or invariably so.
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A. Land Border Exclusions and Expulsions: The United States
As COVID-19 spread across the globe in February and March
2020, U.S. President Donald Trump issued a series of proclamations
suspending entry of certain foreign nationals who had recently
visited Brazil,257 China,258 Iran,259 Ireland and the United
Kingdom,260 and the Schengen Area in Europe.261 The White House
also announced that the United States, in coordination with
UNHCR and IOM, would suspend the refugee resettlement program
for the duration of the pandemic.262 Meanwhile, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) closed all land ports of entry to
undocumented migrants.263 Acting Secretary of Homeland Security
Chad Wolf explained that the United States’ land borders would
remain open for commercial traffic and medical tourism, but that
asylum seekers arriving from Canada and Mexico would be turned
back without the opportunity to apply for relief under the Refugee
Convention and Torture Convention.264 DHS later instructed Border
Patrol agents to return any foreign migrants apprehended along the
U.S.-Mexico border back as quickly as possible, irrespective of
whether they claimed to be refugees, unless there were exigent
circumstances or migrants offered “an affirmative, spontaneous and
reasonably believable claim that they fear being tortured in the
country they are being sent back to.”265 Concurrently with these
257. See Proclamation No. 10041, 85 Fed. Reg. 31,933, 31,933 (May 24, 2020) [hereinafter
Brazil Proclamation].
258. See Proclamation No. 9984, 85 Fed. Reg. 6709, 6710 (Jan. 31, 2020).
259. See Proclamation No. 9992, 85 Fed. Reg. 12,855, 12,855-56 (Feb. 29, 2020).
260. See Proclamation No. 9996, 85 Fed. Reg. 15,341, 15,342 (Mar. 14, 2020).
261. See Proclamation No. 9993, 85 Fed. Reg. 15,045, 15,045-46 (Mar. 11, 2020) (“For
purposes of this proclamation, the Schengen Area comprises 26 European states.”). President
Trump later expanded upon these orders by suspending entry to certain immigrants for the
purpose of promoting employment among resident citizens. See Proclamation No. 10014, 85
Fed. Reg. 23,441, 23,441-42 (Apr. 22, 2020).
262. Priscilla Alvarez, Refugee Admissions to the US Temporarily Suspended, CNN (Mar.
18, 2020, 3:58 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/18/politics/us-refugee-admissions-corona
virus/index.html [https://perma.cc/9VCT-75JK].
263. Zolan Kanno-Youngs & Kirk Semple, Trump Cites Coronavirus as He Announces a
Border Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/20/us/
politics/trump-border-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/9RSS-SB93].
264. See id.
265. Memorandum from U.S. Customs and Border Patrol on COVID-19 CAPIO 1, 2-4,
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6824221-COVID-19-CAPIO.html [https://perma.cc/
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measures, DHS announced that it would summarily expel migrants
held in immigration detention facilities to their country of last
transit or their country of origin.266 Between March and May 2020,
DHS expelled over forty-two thousand detained migrants from the
United States pursuant to these policies—all without conducting
hearings to determine whether asylum seekers within this group
were entitled to non-refoulement.267 Collectively, these measures
brought to an abrupt halt the United States’ decades-long commitment to protect refugees from persecution.
The U.S. government defended these actions by invoking several
domestic statutes that authorize temporary emergency measures in
response to public health crises. First, President Trump cited
section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which
authorized him to suspend entry into the United States whenever
he determines “that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens
into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the
United States.”268 According to President Trump, limiting entry from
Brazil, China, Iran, and other countries with acute COVID-19
outbreaks was necessary to prevent “undetected transmission of the
virus by infected individuals seeking to enter the United States.”269
This, in turn, would counter a serious threat to “the security of [the
U.S.] transportation system and infrastructure and the national
security.”270
Second, DHS invoked legislation enacted in the wake of 9/11 that
authorized its Commissioner of Customs “to close temporarily any
... port of entry or take any other lesser action that may be necessary to respond to the specific threat [to human life or national
interests].”271 DHS claimed that “the risk of continued transmission
NNL3-GSYC].
266. Nationwide Enforcement Encounters: Title 8 Enforcement Actions and Title 42
Expulsions, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT. (Aug. 6, 2020), https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/
stats/cbp-enforcement-statistics/title-8-and-title-42-statistics [https://perma.cc/Y9N7-4SN3];
see US: Suspend Deportations During Pandemic, HUM. RTS. WATCH (June 4, 2020, 9:00 AM),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/06/04/us-suspend-deportations-during-pandemic [https://
perma.cc/48YJ-NQNU].
267. Nationwide Enforcement Encounters, supra note 266.
268. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f).
269. Brazil Proclamation, supra note 257.
270. Id.
271. Notification of Temporary Travel Restrictions Applicable to Land Ports of Entry and

2021]

THE AUTHORITY OF INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW

1123

and spread of COVID-19 between the United States and” its closest
neighbors, Canada and Mexico, in particular, “pose[d] a ‘specific
threat to human life or national interests.’”272 According to the
agency, “maintaining the current level of travel between the ...
nations” would put “the personnel staffing land ports of entry
between the United States and [its neighbors], as well as the
individuals traveling through these ports of entry, at increased risk
of exposure to COVID-19.”273
Third, U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) Alex
M. Azar II asserted that the Public Health Service Act (PHSA)
empowered him to authorize the expulsion of asylum seekers and
other migrants who were already present within the United
States.274 Under section 362 of the PHSA, if the Secretary determines that a “communicable disease in a foreign country” poses a
“serious danger” to public health in the United States, he may
“prohibit, in whole or in part, the introduction of persons” from that
country “for such period of time as he may deem necessary for such
purpose.”275 To bolster the case for expelling migrants from the
United States, HHS promulgated an interim final rule defining the
“introduction of persons” under section 362 to “encompass those who
have physically crossed a border of the United States.”276 Secretary
Azar defended this move in a press conference by asserting that
detained “migrants were spreading the virus to other migrants, to
C.B.P. agents and border health care workers and even the United
Ferries Service Between the United States and Mexico, 85 Fed. Reg. 16,547, 16,547 & n.4
(Mar. 24, 2020) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. ch. 1) (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1318(b)(1)(C), (b)(2))
[hereinafter Mexico Travel Restrictions]; Notification of Temporary Travel Restrictions
Applicable to Land Ports of Entry and Ferries Service Between the United States and
Canada, 85 Fed. Reg. 16,548, 16,549 n.4 (Mar. 24, 2020) [hereinafter Canada Travel
Restrictions].
272. Mexico Travel Restrictions, supra note 271, at 16,547; Canada Travel Restrictions,
supra note 271, at 16,549.
273. Mexico Travel Restrictions, supra note 271, at 16,547; Canada Travel Restrictions,
supra note 271, at 16,549.
274. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., Secretary Azar Declares Public
Health Emergency for United States for 2019 Novel Coronavirus (Jan. 31, 2020), https://www.
hhs.gov/about/news/2020/01/31/secretary-azar-declares-public-health-emergency-us-2019novel-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/RA4Q-ZB7A].
275. Public Health Service Act § 362, 42 U.S.C. § 265.
276. Control of Communicable Diseases; Foreign Quarantine: Suspension of Introduction
of Persons into United States from Designated Foreign Countries or Places for Public Health
Purposes, 85 Fed. Reg. 16,559, 16,563 (Mar. 24, 2020) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 71).
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States population as a whole.”277 When pressed for details about
Secretary Azar’s assertions, however, an HHS spokesperson later
conceded that the agency had yet to identify any cases of coronavirus among detained migrants; rather, the agency was taking
preemptive steps to prevent a possible outbreak.278
The United States’ emergency measures have provoked vigorous
legal challenges. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has
led the way, filing multiple lawsuits against Secretary Wolf to
challenge DHS’s exclusion of child asylum seekers at the United
States’ borders with Canada and Mexico.279 In these cases, the
ACLU has argued that statutes authorizing emergency measures do
not supersede the INA’s subsequently enacted and unequivocal
prohibitions of refoulement.280
Amidst this litigation in domestic courts, the United States has
not made a meaningful effort to justify its border closures and
expulsions under international law. The closest it has come to
publicly defending its emergency measures from the perspective of
international law is a single paragraph in an email from the U.S.
State Department prepared in response to an inquiry from congressional leaders.281 The paragraph reads as follows:
277. Kanno-Youngs & Semple, supra note 263.
278. Id. At the time Secretary Azar announced this move, the United States had 17,000
confirmed COVID-19 cases, while Mexico had 164 confirmed cases of the coronavirus, and the
Northern Triangle countries of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, which produce many
asylum seekers, had 37 collectively. Id.
279. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 1, J.B.B.C. v. Wolf, No. 1:20cv01509 (D.D.C. June 9, 2020) [hereinafter J.B.B.C. Complaint], https://www.aclu.org/sites/de
fault/files/field_document/jbbc_v_wolf_-_complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/CHF7-P7N3];
Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 1, G.Y.J.P. v. Wolf, No. 1:20-cv01511 (D.D.C.
June 9, 2020) [hereinafter G.Y.J.P. Complaint], https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/gyjp-vwolf-complaint [https://perma.cc/ZT5R-HK7T].
280. See G.Y.J.P. Complaint, supra note 279, at 25-26; J.B.B.C. Complaint, supra note 279,
at 24-25. At the time of this writing, a U.S. district court has issued a temporary restraining
order to protect the named plaintiffs in these cases from expulsion, and the court awaits the
government’s responsive pleading. Transcript of Telephonic Motion Hearing at 47, J.B.B.C.
v. Wolf, No. 1:20-cv01509 (D.D.C. June 24, 2020).
281. See E-mail from U.S. Dep’t of State, Question re: Asylum Laws and Policy (Apr. 24,
2020, 6:23 PM), https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:KErNE2xzszIJ:ht
tps://foreignaffairs.house.gov/_cache/files/1/5/15b9fb59-24f7-44e1-a8dd-b438072a8cc7/
40C6CAE6BA2441181901371E291682E4.april-24-opinion.pdf+&cd=1&h1=en&ct=clnk&gl=us
[https://perma.cc/5LDJ-ZVTP]; see also Oona Hathaway, The Trump Administration’s Indefensible Legal Defense of Its Asylum Ban, JUST SEC. (May 15, 2020), https://www.just
security.org/70192/the-trump-administrations-indefensible-legal-defense-of-its-asylum-ban/
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Stopping the introduction of people and articles from COVID-19risky locations is indispensable to protecting our public health
and the national security of the United States. The Administration’s policy comports with our domestic law obligations concerning asylum seekers. As for our international obligations, the
Supreme Court has noted that neither the United States nor any
State or municipality has any legal obligation to conform its
conduct to international treaties that are not self-executing or
otherwise implemented into domestic law by an Act of
Congress.282

This statement is riddled with legal errors and non sequiturs.
Contrary to the State Department’s suggestion, non-self-executing
treaties do bind the United States under international law,
regardless of whether the United States has incorporated them into
domestic legislation.283 Customary norms also bind the United
States under international law without any requirement for further
domestic implementation.284 Furthermore, even assuming arguendo
that the United States would not incur international obligations
without domestic legislative implementation, this response would
offer no cover for the administration’s actions, because Congress has
codified the relevant non-refoulement obligations in the INA and
associated regulations.285 Accordingly, none of the legal arguments
advanced in the State Department email are responsive to the
charge that the United States has violated its obligations under the
Refugee Protocol, the Torture Convention, and customary international law.
[https://perma.cc/7HXS-P5A9] (discussing this interchange between the State Department
and congressional leaders).
282. E-mail from U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 281 (first citing Medellín v. Texas, 552
U.S. 491, 504-06 (2008); and then citing Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888)).
283. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELS. L. OF THE U.S. § 310(1) (AM. L. INST.
2020) (“Whether a treaty provision is self-executing concerns how the provision is
implemented domestically and does not affect the obligation of the United States to comply
with it under international law. Even when a treaty provision is not self-executing,
compliance with the provision may be achieved through ... executive, administrative, or other
action outside the courts.”).
284. Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“International law is part of our law ...
where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision,
resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations.”).
285. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (implementing Article 33(1) of the Refugee Convention);
8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16(c)(4), 208.17(a) (2020).
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Nor could the United States offer a more plausible legal justification for its suspension of refugee protection. Although international
law does not obligate states to grant visas to refugees seeking
protection from abroad, it does forbid states from repulsing refugees
at their borders and expelling refugees within their borders—including those awaiting status determinations.286 Moreover,
the Refugee Convention’s exception and limitation clauses require
an individualized assessment of dangerousness;287 as Oona Hathaway has explained, these clauses “cannot be applied on a blanket
basis to everyone seeking asylum regardless of whether they
actually pose a threat”—particularly given the availability of “lesser
alternatives—like quarantine—that could address the risk.”288 Even
if the United States excluded or expelled only migrants who tested
positive for COVID-19, such measures could still violate the Torture
Convention and ICCPR, which do not permit states to send individuals to torture or CIDT under any circumstances.289 For a host of
reasons, therefore, the public health concerns associated with the

286. See Refugee Protocol, supra note 26, art. I (incorporating the non-refoulement principle in Article 33 of the Refugee Convention and incorporating the prohibitions of expulsion
and refoulement from Articles 32 and 33 of the Refugee Convention).
287. See Refugee Convention, supra note 1, arts. 32, 33.
288. Hathaway, supra note 281 (analyzing the text of Article 33(2)); see also U.N. High
Comm’r for Refugees, Key Legal Considerations on Access to Territory for Persons in Need of
International Protection in the Context of the COVID-19 Response, ¶ 6 (Mar. 16, 2020), https://
www.refworld.org/docid/5e7132834.html [https://perma.cc/Z6DB-5BPN] (arguing that health
risks can be addressed on an individual or group basis through “testing and/or quarantine,
which would enable authorities to manage the arrival of asylum-seekers in a safe manner,”
whereas “[d]enial of access to territory without safeguards to protect against refoulement
cannot be justified on the grounds of any health risk”). Critics have argued that the blanket
nature of the United States’ response smacks of bad faith. See, e.g., León CastellanosJankiewicz, U.S. Border Closure Breaches International Refugee Law, OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 3,
2020), http://opiniojuris.org/2020/04/03/covid-19-symposium-us-border-closure-breaches-inter
national-refugee-law/ [https://perma.cc/28NB-GDWB] (“[D]iscriminatory action against
migrants is being cloaked as a public health emergency response.”); Lucas Guttentag,
Coronavirus Border Expulsions: CDC’s Assault on Asylum Seekers and Unaccompanied
Minors, JUST SEC. (Apr. 13, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/69640/coronavirus-borderexpulsions-cdcs-assault-on-asylum-seekers-and-unaccompanied-minors/ [https://perma.cc/
VV2W-PXUB] (characterizing the United States’ emergency measures as “an act of medical
gerrymandering” that “tries to justify an end-run around congressionally mandated
procedural rights and protections essential for refugees and unaccompanied minors” in order
“to achieve an impermissible goal”).
289. See Guttentag, supra note 288.
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COVID-19 pandemic do not legally justify the United States’ failure to comply with the non-refoulement principle.
B. Indirect Refoulement: Canada
As the United States was closing its borders and summarily
expelling asylum seekers, Canada and the United States entered
into a purportedly temporary agreement under which Canada will
immediately return asylum seekers to the United States who enter
Canada via irregular U.S.-Canada border crossings or via air or
sea.290 Since 2004, Canada has turned asylum seekers crossing at
regular points of entry back to the United States pursuant to a
preexisting “safe third country agreement” between the two
states.291 Under the agreement, the United States committed to
accept certain asylum seekers who had passed through its borders
en route to Canada.292 To ensure compliance with the duty of nonrefoulement, asylum seekers delivered to the United States in this
manner were to receive “access to a refugee status determination”
in U.S. immigration court before any decision was made to “return
or remove” them to their country of origin.293 During the COVID-19
pandemic, however, the United States has refused to abide by its
obligation to conduct refugee status determinations, declaring that
“[i]n the event an alien cannot be returned to Mexico or Canada,” for
the duration of the pandemic it would “secure return to the alien’s
country of origin” as expeditiously as possible without a hearing to
determine refugee status.294 As a result, asylum seekers returned
to the United States under either the safe third country agreement
290. Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19): Refugees, Asylum Claimants, Sponsors and PRRA
Applicants, GOV’T OF CAN. (Oct. 28, 2020), https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugeescitizenship/services/coronavirus-covid19/refugees.html [https://perma.cc/WT2A-DCSG].
291. See Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Canada for Cooperation in the Examination of Refugee Status Claims from
Nationals of Third Countries, U.S.-Can., arts. 3-5, Dec. 5, 2002, T.I.A.S. No. 04-1229.
292. Id. art. 5. Canada likewise committed to accept asylum seekers who passed through
its borders en route to the United States. Id.
293. See id. art. 3(1).
294. Anna Mehler Paperny, Asylum-Seekers Turned Back by Canada at Its Border Will Be
Shipped Home, U.S. Says, NAT’L POST (Mar. 27, 2020), https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/
u-s-to-return-canada-bound-asylum-seekers-stopped-at-border-to-home-nations [https://
perma.cc/S9YN-4KFN] (quoting U.S. Customs and Border Protection spokesperson Michael
Niezgoda).
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or as a result of Canada’s closed-border COVID-19 policy face a serious risk of chain refoulement in violation of international law.
Despite these concerns, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced in March 2020 that most asylum seekers attempting to
cross the U.S.-Canada border at irregular crossings would be summarily turned back to the United States.295 Critics lambasted this
decision, arguing that Canada’s policy would lead inevitably to
indirect refoulement in violation of Canada’s obligations under
international law.296 Canadian diplomats reportedly sought assurances that the United States would conduct refugee status
determinations for asylum seekers returned to the United States,
but there is no evidence that these discussions have borne fruit.297
Rather than address the legal objections against its border restrictions head on, the Canadian government emphasized instead that
the country faces “extraordinary circumstances,”298 and advised that
its exclusion of asylum seekers under the recent COVID-19 closedborder policy is “exceptional”299 and “temporary.”300 More generally,
all nonessential travel to Canada has been prohibited, with no
exception for asylum seekers.301

295. See Kathleen Harris, Canada to Turn Back Asylum Seekers, Close Border at Midnight
to Stop Spread of COVID-19, CBC NEWS (Mar. 20, 2020), https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/
trudeau-covid19-coronavirus-medical-equipment-1.5504149 [https://perma.cc/33Y8-ZM9N].
Subsequently, Canada has made exceptions for asylum seekers who are U.S. nationals,
unaccompanied minors, or stateless persons habitually resident in the United States. See
Minimizing the Risk of Exposure to COVID-19 in Canada Order, GOV’T OF CAN.: ORDS. IN
COUNCIL DIV. (Mar. 20, 2020), https://orders-in-council.canada.ca/attachment.php?attach=
38958&lang=en [https://perma.cc/6S5Z-9SPQ].
296. See Paperny, supra note 294 (citing concerns raised by Amnesty International); Teresa
Wright, Canada Could Face Legal Trouble over Refugee Deportations: Advocates, CTV NEWS
(Mar. 28, 2020, 7:30 PM), https://www.ctvnews.ca/health/coronavirus/canada-could-face-legaltrouble-over-refugee-deportations-advocates-1.4872726 [https://perma.cc/9WDY-WDRG]
(citing concerns raised by multiple NGOs).
297. See Catharine Tunney, Canada ‘Urgently’ Discussing Asylum Seeker Deportation Issue
with U.S., CBC NEWS (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/troops-trump-bordercoronavirus-1.5512261 [https://perma.cc/MQ5C-VFRM].
298. Harris, supra note 295 (quoting Public Safety Minister Bill Blair).
299. Id. (quoting Prime Minister Trudeau).
300. Paperny, supra note 294 (quoting Public Safety spokesperson Mary-Liz Power).
301. Oliver O’Connell, Coronavirus: Canada Extends Travel Restrictions, INDEPENDENT
(June 30, 2020, 10:36 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/canadacoronavirus-travel-restrictions-extended-july-august-a9594676.html [https://perma.cc/V6F65SMP].
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C. Maritime Interdiction: Cyprus, Italy, Malta, and Malaysia
As Canada and the United States were jettisoning refugee
protections at their land borders in response to COVID-19, other
states were suspending non-refoulement at sea. Cyprus was a
trendsetter in this regard. Before COVID-19, Cyprus had the
highest number of Syrian asylum seekers per capita in Europe, and
the continued flow of migrants was straining the country’s resources
and political commitment to refugee protection.302 In March 2020,
Cyprus announced that, based on the global pandemic, it would begin intercepting foreign vessels that were attempting to reach its
shores.303 Although Cyprus offered fuel, clothing, food, and water to
asylum seekers adrift at sea, it would no longer allow them to
pursue safe haven within its territory.304
Italy took similar action in April 2020, announcing that, due to its
own skyrocketing COVID-19 infection rate, it did not qualify as a
“place of safety” under international maritime law.305 Thereafter,
Italy would continue to allow Italian vessels to come and go from its
ports, but it would drive away ships flying foreign flags, including
those operated by nongovernmental humanitarian organizations
(NGOs) that were rescuing refugees in distress on the Mediterranean.306 In the weeks that followed, Italy repeatedly ignored pleas
for assistance from overloaded dinghies bearing asylum seekers
302. Andrew Connelly, Cyprus Pushes Syrian Refugees Back at Sea Due to Coronavirus, AL
JAZEERA (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/3/30/cyprus-pushes-syrianrefugees-back-at-sea-due-to-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/6T64-8AXP]. Cyprus made
exceptions only for Cypriots, European workers, or people with special two-week entry
permits. Id.
303. See id.
304. Id. Some Syrian refugees obtained temporary refuge in the autonomous Turkish
Cypriot region of Northern Cyprus, where they faced the prospect of eventual deportation to
Turkey or elsewhere. Id.
305. See Andrea Maria Pelliconi, Covid-19: Italy Is Not a “Place of Safety” Anymore. Is the
Decision to Close Italian Ports Compliant with Human Rights Obligations?, EJIL:TALK! (Apr.
23, 2020), https://www.ejiltalk.org/covid-19-italy-is-not-a-place-of-safety-anymore-is-the-deci
sion-to-close-italian-ports-compliant-with-human-rights-obligations/ [https://perma.cc/7YL87JMT] (providing a translated quotation from Inter-ministerial Decree Number 150 from
April 7, 2020). Under the 1979 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue,
states have a duty to rescue persons in peril at sea and deliver them to a “place of safety.” See
Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO] Res. 167(78), annex, Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons
Rescued at Sea, ¶¶ 3.1, 6.5, 6.12 (May 20, 2004).
306. Pelliconi, supra note 305.

1130

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:1067

from Libya, and it denied disembarkation to vessels that neared its
shores.307 Critics argued that this “automatic and indiscriminate
rejection” of non-Italian ships violated the principle of non-refoulement as enshrined in the ECHR and the E.U. Charter of Fundamental Rights.308
Shortly after Italy issued its declaration, Malta followed suit,
closing its own ports to asylum seekers on the theory that “it is
presently not possible to ensure the availability of a safe place on
the Maltese territory, without compromising the efficiency/functionality of the national health, logistic and safety structures, which
are dedicated to limiting the spread of the contagious disease.”309
Malta’s Prime Minister, Robert Abela, explained that once the state
closed its “ports and airport to cruise passengers and tourists” due
to the COVID-19 crisis, it did “not make sense to then let migrants
in.”310 “‘Hundreds of thousands of people in Libya want to cross the
Mediterranean to Italy or Malta,’ Abela said. ‘We will be firm in our
commitment not to open our ports.’”311
Sixteen NGOs responded with a joint statement castigating Malta
for closing its ports to refugees. The joint statement explained that
“under no circumstances is Malta permitted to return persons to a
territory where their lives and safety would be at risk. A public
health emergency does not ... exonerate Malta from its responsibility to ensure that rescued persons are not returned to Libya.”312 The
NGOs predicted that Malta’s announcement would

307. See European Governments Must Stop Using COVID-19 as an Excuse to Block Lifesaving Search and Rescue Operations, DRS. WITHOUT BORDERS (Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.
doctorswithoutborders.org/what-we-do/news-stories/news/european-governments-must-stopusing-covid-19-excuse-block-lifesaving [https://perma.cc/X5V3-F8UJ].
308. Pelliconi, supra note 305.
309. Salvo Nicolosi, Non-refoulement During a Health Emergency, EJIL:TALK! (May 14,
2020), https://www.ejiltalk.org/non-refoulement-during-a-health-emergency/ [https://perma.
cc/PYZ2-6KXJ] (quoting the Maltese declaration).
310. Malta to Keep Migrants at Sea Until EU Acts, MSN (May 1, 2020) [hereinafter Migrants at Sea], http://www.msn.com/en-xl/europe/top-stories/malta-to-keep-migrants-at-seauntil-eu-acts/ar-BB13viVY?li=BBKxOeh&MSCC=1544122609&ocid=spartanntp [https://
perma.cc/6GFQ-WX34].
311. Id.
312. Joint NGO Press Release, Migrants Should Not Be Sacrificed for the Nation’s WellBeing (Apr. 10, 2020), https://aditus.org.mt/migrants-should-not-be-sacrificed-for-the-nationswell-being/ [https://perma.cc/7ZT4-VHNB].
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result in either people stranded out at sea for days, possibly
weeks, or in their return to Libya, where they will probably face
atrocious human rights violations. It is unacceptable for Malta
to exploit the COVID-19 pandemic to shelve its human rights
obligations and endanger the lives of men, women and
children.313

Sadly, this prediction proved to be accurate. Just four days later,
Malta acknowledged that it had intercepted a boat and had
returned the asylum seekers on board to Libya, their point of
departure, without undertaking refugee status determinations.314
An investigation by the IOM determined that before the Maltese
Coast Guard boarded the boat to return it to Libya, the vessel had
drifted aimlessly for several days without fuel after being denied
access to Italian and Maltese ports.315 Five bodies were discovered
among the fifty-one survivors.316 Seven other migrants who embarked on the trip from Libya had gone missing.317
Resistance to refugee migration was not limited to states along
the Mediterranean. In mid-April, Malaysia turned back several
boats containing hundreds of Rohingya asylum seekers from
Myanmar based on fears of possible COVID-19 transmission.318
Bangladesh eventually rescued hundreds of these asylum seekers
after they had spent months adrift in the Bay of Bengal, but not
before dozens of others on board had perished.319 Between May 1
and June 12, 2020, Malaysia blocked another twenty-two boats
carrying asylum seekers from Myanmar, jeopardizing the lives of
313. Id.
314. Migrants at Sea, supra note 310.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Malaysia Turns Back Rohingya Boat over Coronavirus Fears, STRAITS TIMES (Apr. 18,
2020, 5:00 AM) [hereinafter Malaysia Turns Back Rohingya], https://www.straitstimes. com/
asia/se-asia/malaysia-turns-back-rohingya-boat-over-virus-fears-0 [https://perma.cc/XU6TQ35C]; Rebecca Ratcliffe, Hundreds of Rohingya Refugees Stuck at Sea, Say Rights Groups,
GUARDIAN (Apr. 17, 2020, 12:10 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/global/2020/apr/17/mal
aysia-and-thailand-urged-to-help-stranded-rohingya-refugees [https://perma.cc/E389-KM8W].
319. Ratcliffe, supra note 318. Bangladesh later changed course, declaring that “[n]ot a
single Rohingya will be allowed to enter.” Pierfilippo M. Natta, COVID-19 Is No Excuse to
Abandon Basic Principles Protecting Refugees and Asylum Seekers, DIPLOMAT (May 4, 2020),
https://thediplomat.com/2020/05/covid-19-is-no-excuse-to-abandon-basic-principles-protectingrefugees-and-asylum-seekers/ [https://perma.cc/DC5G-7ZX6].
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those on board.320 Nonetheless, Malaysia defended its “maritime
surveillance” program, explaining that the government “strongly
feared that undocumented migrants who try to enter Malaysia
either by land or sea will bring (Covid-19) into the country.”321
UNHCR, IOM, and the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime have
expressed alarm at Malaysia’s actions.322 While acknowledging that
states may justifiably take a variety of exceptional “border management measures to manage risks to public health,” the international
organizations have emphasized that such measures “should not
result in the closure of avenues to asylum, or in forcing people to
either return to situations of danger or seek to land clandestinely,
without health screening or quarantine.”323 Repulsing asylum
seekers at sea “violates basic human rights, the law of the sea and
the principles of customary international law by which all States are
equally bound.”324
D. Evaluating Emergency Restrictions on Refugee Migration
While by no means exhaustive, these case studies illustrate how
the COVID-19 pandemic has undermined state compliance with the
duty of non-refoulement. Under the Refugee Convention, states
plausibly may exclude asylum seekers based on national security
concerns, such as the public health risks associated with COVID-19,
but they must do so on an individualized basis; the Convention does
320. Malaysia/Thailand: Allow Rohingya Refugees Ashore, HUM. RTS. WATCH (June 12,
2020, 9:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/06/12/malaysia/thailand-allow-rohingyarefugees-ashore [https://perma.cc/EP3D-K69W] (citing a figure provided by Malaysian Defense
Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob); see also A.S.M. Suza Uddin & Poppy McPherson, Traffickers
Demand Payments for Rohingya Stranded at Sea, REUTERS (June 15, 2020, 12:17 PM), https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya/traffickers-demand-payments-for-rohingyastranded-at-sea-idUSKBN23M2BT#_ga=2.220943768.1875369749.1593027822-815747816.
1583893753 [https://perma.cc/3QBB-AZCY] (reporting that in some cases human smugglers,
unable to deliver Rohingya refugees to Malaysia, have remained at sea for months while
demanding payments from the refugees’ families to secure their release).
321. Malaysia Turns Back Rohingya, supra note 318 (quoting a statement from the
Malaysian Air Force).
322. Press Release, U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Joint Statement by UNHCR, IOM and
UNODC on Protection at Sea in the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea (May 6, 2020), https://
www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/press/2020/5/5eb15b804/joint-statement-unhcr-iom-unodcprotection-sea-bay-bengal-andaman-sea.html [https://perma.cc/VK9A-MPCS].
323. Id.
324. Id.; see Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 97, 155, 157.
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not contemplate blanket border closures.325 The requirement that
states make individual assessments means that governments
seeking to use Article 33(2) to close borders in light of COVID-19
would need to offer a legal justification for doing so.326 More
specifically, they would need to show that a given individual
actually has COVID-19 and that there is not a less intrusive means
than refoulement to achieve the goal of public safety.327 Allowing
asylum seekers to self-isolate for fourteen days or detaining them in
quarantine for that period of time would be less intrusive for these
purposes.328 In the case studies, however, the states concerned
invoked general public health concerns in support of wholesale
border closures, expulsions, and maritime interdictions without
undertaking individualized determinations of dangerousness for
particular asylum seekers.329 Nor did the relevant states contemplate less harmful measures that could achieve their stated public
health goals, such as enforced quarantine.330 Without question,
therefore, these measures violate the Refugee Convention.
Even if the states in the case studies had tested asylum seekers
for COVID-19 and excluded only those who were capable of
transmitting the virus, the emergency measures in question would
still be legally suspect. Setting aside whether COVID-19 transmission by refugees qualifies “as a danger to [a country’s] security,”
triggering exceptions to the Refugee Convention’s duty of nonrefoulement,331 asylum seekers who faced a substantial threat of
torture would be entitled to protection under the Torture Convention regardless of their health status.332 Likewise, refugees on the
325. See supra Part I.A. But see Kate Ogg, COVID-19 Travel Restrictions: A Violation of
Non-refoulement Obligations?, AUSTRALIAN NAT’L UNIV.: COLL. OF L. (Apr. 24, 2020), https://
law.anu.edu.au/research/essay/covid-19-and-international-law/covid-19-travel-restrictionsviolation-non-refoulement-obligations [https://perma.cc/7C8R-C33N] (arguing that Article
33(2) does not apply to COVID-19 because the pandemic does not imperil “basic interests” of
the state).
326. See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, supra note 288, ¶¶ 5-7.
327. See id. (arguing that border controls adopted in response to COVID-19 “must be nondiscriminatory as well as necessary, proportionate and reasonable to the aim of protecting
public health”).
328. See id. ¶ 6.
329. See supra Part III.A-C.
330. See supra Part III.A-C; U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, supra note 288, ¶¶ 5-7.
331. See Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 33(2).
332. See Torture Convention, supra note 9, arts. 2(2), 3.
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Mediterranean who were threatened with CIDT in their countries
of origin would be entitled to relief from refoulement under the
European Convention on Human Rights.333 To the extent that the
international community embraces this Article’s argument that the
prohibition of refoulement qualifies as a peremptory norm, the
exceptional border controls adopted by Canada, Cyprus, Italy,
Malta, Malaysia, and the United States would also violate international jus cogens.334 All of these legal protections would preclude
states from returning asylum seekers to harm abroad, regardless of
asylum seekers’ health status and regardless of whether customary
international law recognizes the duty of non-refoulement as jus
cogens. Thus, irrespective of the level of threat posed by COVID-19,
international law prohibits states from closing their borders in a
manner that is inconsistent with their peremptory responsibilities
to protect refugees from torture, CIDT, or other serious harm.
Significantly, in none of the case studies did the states concerned
make a serious effort to justify their border restrictions under
international law.335 Instead, they essentially asserted a Schmittian
prerogative to decide unilaterally that the pandemic constituted an
emergency that necessitated temporary recourse to refoulement.336
Implicit in these measures was the unspoken assumption that
states could legitimately allow domestic security concerns to trump
the interests of refugees, who were ostensibly “alien” to their selfdetermining political association.337 Legal experts have argued that
such necessity-based rationales for border closures, expulsions, and
maritime interdiction are unconvincing, given the obvious alternative of temporarily quarantining ailing refugees to limit viral
transmission.338 For Schmitt and his defenders, however, objective
333. See Chahal v. United Kingdom, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1831, 1853-55; Soering v. United
Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. 4, 34-35 (1989).
334. See VCLT, supra note 7, art. 53.
335. See supra Parts III.A-C.
336. Cf. SCHMITT, supra note 99, at 5-7.
337. Cf. id. at 6-7, 12-13.
338. See, e.g., Claire Ellis, COVID-19: Canada Locks Its Gates to Asylum Seekers, OPEN
DEMOCRACY (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/pandemic-border/covid-19canada-locks-its-gates-asylum-seekers/ [https://perma.cc/4RDB-8GPM] (arguing that
excluding refugees and asylum seekers is not necessary for effectively combatting the COVID19 pandemic). This is not to gainsay the genuine risk that some asylum seekers present
threats of COVID-19 transmission. See Migrant Workers Contract Covid-19 at Thai Detention
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justifiability and the authority to decide are separate matters. In
Schmitt’s memorable words, it is the sovereign who “decides
whether there is an extreme emergency as well as what must be
done to eliminate it.”339 By asserting the right to determine unilaterally what measures are necessary to curb the spread of COVID19—up to and including refoulement—Canada, Cyprus, Italy,
Malaysia, Malta, and the United States have held themselves out
as Schmittian sovereigns whose authority over asylum seekers does
not depend on compliance with IRL. Critics have expressed concern,
therefore, that states’ emergency measures are undermining the
principle of non-refoulement and could cause long-lasting damage to
IRL.340
The COVID-19 border closures, expulsions, and maritime interdictions discussed above demonstrate abject indifference to the
possibility that the returned refugee may have no other place where
she can lawfully reside free of persecution. As states across the
world adopt closed-border policies, the possibility of a refugee’s bare
existence constituting a wrong moves closer to realization. That
possibility alone, combined with states’ refusal to participate in
IRL’s multilateral regime of surrogate protection, is enough to show
that the states discussed in this Part have forfeited their claim to
legitimate authority vis-à-vis exiled outsiders. Not only have states
in this context given up on the rule of international law and human
rights, they likewise have given up on the idea that brought Western civilization out of feudalism and into modernity: the principle
that individuals are to be judged based on their volitional actions
rather than on a mere status over which they have no say or recourse.341 When states prevent refugees from accessing protection
Center, UCA NEWS (May 5, 2020, 6:51 AM), https://www.ucanews.com/news/migrant-workerscontract-covid-19-at-thai-detention-center/87922 [https://perma.cc/GX8B-JKZW] (reporting
on a COVID-19 outbreak in a Rohingya refugee camp in Thailand); Joe McCarthy, Rohingya
Refugees Brace for Catastrophic COVID-19 Outbreak, GLOB. CITIZEN (May 21, 2020), https://
www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/rohingya-refugee-covid-19-pandemic/ [https://perma.cc/
L7CB-7ACD] (describing a COVID-19 outbreak in Bangladesh).
339. SCHMITT, supra note 99, at 7.
340. See, e.g., Mourad & Schwartz, supra note 6 (expressing concern that if emergency
measures “persist, these policies could have disastrous consequences and potentially upend
the already fragile global refugee and asylum regime”).
341. For discussion of this principle as applied to the criminal prosecution of refugees, see
Evan J. Criddle, The Case Against Prosecuting Refugees, 115 NW. U. L. REV. 717 (2020).
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within their borders, they thereby tear asunder the foundations of
their own authority to rule over humanity’s most vulnerable.
CONCLUSION
During a public emergency, such as the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, political pressure to suspend refugee protection can be acute,
as domestic stakeholders demand border closures to safeguard
public health and national security. But the cost is too high, and the
means are disproportionate. As this Article has shown, the duty of
non-refoulement is an indispensable component of the international
rule of law. The authority states claim over their territory vis-à-vis
outsiders can be understood as legitimate only if they resist the
temptation to return refugees to persecution abroad. This principle
is foundational to the authority of international law and applies
with undiminished force during national crises. The duty of nonrefoulement therefore merits international acceptance as jus cogens.
We recognize, of course, that it remains uncertain how the
COVID-19 pandemic will shape the practical development or erosion
of IRL. Emergency measures adopted during the pandemic might
become entrenched in national laws and policies, undermining
refugee protection for decades to come. However, that bleak future
is not inevitable. With concerted effort from UNHCR and refugee
advocacy organizations, states might eventually acknowledge the
humanitarian costs of their border closures, expulsions, and
maritime interdictions, as well as recognize how these policies have
undermined the legitimacy of the international order on which their
own claims to authority and legality rest. Lessons learned from the
current crisis may create opportunities for the international
community to strengthen IRL by enshrining the duty of nonrefoulement as jus cogens. The international legal system’s claim to
be a legal system for all humanity—for exiles as well as resident
nationals—hangs in the balance.

